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What Developments in Western Europe 
Tell Us about American Critiques of 
Corporate Criminal Liability† 
Sara Sun Beale†† and Adam G. Safwat††† 
Although corporate criminal liability has been 
recognized in the United States for nearly a century,1 
contemporary academic commentators have questioned its 
legitimacy and argued that it is inferior to its alternatives: 
civil liability for the corporation and/or criminal liability for 
individual corporate agents.  Other academic critics have 
attacked the present definitions of corporate criminal 
liability.2  In other words, although corporate criminal 
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 1. The seminal case recognizing corporate criminal liability is New York 
Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).  For a 
general discussion of the history of corporate criminal liability in the United 
States, see Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability § 1:01-1:19 (2d ed. 
1992), and 1 Sarah N. Welling, Sara Sun Beale, & Pamela H. Bucy, Federal 
Criminal Law and Related Actions: Crimes, Forfeiture, the False Claims Act and 
Rico § 5.2 (1998). 
 2. For examples of influential proposals to restrict or reframe the scope of 
respondeat superior liability, see Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962) & cmt. 2(c) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (restricting 
corporate liability to criminal conduct performed, participated in, or recklessly 
tolerated by the board of directors or corporate officers or agents whose positions 
in the corporate hierarchy are high enough that they may reasonably be deemed 
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liability has also had its academic champions, it has been 
under attack in the United States.  The situation in Europe 
poses a sharp contrast.  Europe does not have a long 
history of recognizing corporate criminal liability.  In the 
last quarter of the twentieth century, however, many 
Western European nations have created criminal liability 
for corporations.  The juxtaposition of these European and 
American trends raises the question we wish to explore: if 
corporate criminal liability is so controversial in the United 
States, why are many Western European countries 
creating or expanding the criminal liability of corporations?  
Or, to turn the question around, what can we learn from 
the European experience that might shed light on the 
academic dispute in the United States about the 
justifications for imposing criminal liability on 
corporations?3 
This debate takes on added significance in view of the 
remarkable litany of corporate misconduct that has come to 
 
to have the authority to set policy for the corporation); Jennifer Arlen, The 
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Legal Stud. 
833, 848-49 (1994) (arguing that a strict regime of vicarious corporate liability can 
have the perverse effect of discouraging socially desirable corporate monitoring); 
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 
75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095, 1099 (1991) (proposing that corporate liability be based 
upon corporate “ethos,” or personality, in order to limit criminal liability to cases 
where the criminal conduct in question is consistent with corporate goals, policies, 
and ethos, rather than the result of actions by one or two maverick employees); 
Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687, 736 (1997) 
(arguing in favor of imposing high sanctions based on vicarious liability but 
mitigating those sanctions based upon the corporation’s compliance activities).  
The United States Sentencing Commission has proposed a major revision of the 
corporate sentencing guidelines that may be seen as a response to these critiques.  
Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, Effective Compliance and Ethics 
Programs in Chapter Eight, 69 Fed. Reg. 28994, 29018-25, (§ 8B2.1, § 8C2.5(g) 
§ 8C2.5(f), § 8D1.4(c), § 8F1.1)  (proposed April 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/2004cong.pdf.  These Amendments will be effective 
in November 2004 unless Congress intervenes. 
 3. For a sobering description of the difficulties that attend all comparative 
analyses, see Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All?  A Comment on 
the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int’l L. 207, 248-53 (2003); see also Herbert L. Bernstein, Whose Advantage After 
All?  A Comment on the Comparison of Civil Justice Systems, 21 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 587 (1988). 
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light in both the U.S. and Europe in recent years.  
Following the 1990s, a decade that saw a wave of antitrust, 
environmental, and fraud prosecutions of major 
corporations,4 the new century began with a series of 
corporate accounting scandals that rocked the stock 
markets, destroyed billions in equity, and caused the loss of 
tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of jobs.  In the United 
States, the most prominent example was Enron (formerly 
the seventh most valuable company in the United States),5 
which has lost approximately $100 billion in shareholder 
equity6 and eventually filed for bankruptcy after the 
revelation that it had systematically used special purpose 
entities to shift debt off its books and hide corporate losses.7  
As of July 2004, thirty-one persons connected to Enron had 
been indicted, and roughly one third of those have been 
convicted.8  Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, one of 
the largest accounting firms in the world, was charged with 
and convicted of one count of obstruction of justice in 
relation to its Enron activities.9  Anderson subsequently 
 
 4. For an interesting list of the 100 most serious corporate criminal crimes of the 
1990s (ranked by the size of the criminal fine imposed), see Russell Mokhiber, Top 100 
Corporate Criminals of the Decade, at http://www.corporatepredators.org/top100.html  
(visited May 31, 2004).  The offenses fell into fourteen categories of crime: 
Environmental (38), antitrust (20), fraud (13), campaign finance (7), food and drug (6), 
financial crimes (4), false statements (3), illegal exports (3), illegal boycott (1), worker 
death (1), bribery (1), obstruction of justice (1), public corruption (1), and tax evasion 
(1).  Nine of the twenty five most serious cases involved antitrust violations; the fines 
in those nine cases totaled approximately $1.2 billion.  The largest single fine, $500 
million, was imposed upon F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. in 1999 for leading a 
worldwide conspiracy to fix and raise prices and allocate market shares for vitamins.  
Id. at 15.  Mokhiber, the editor of the Corporate Crime Reporter, draws his data from 
that publication. 
 5. Bill Wasik, Dismal Beat: The March of Personal-Finance Journalism, 
Harper’s Magazine, March 1, 2003, at 81. 
 6. Our View; Corporate Cruelty, Press Enterprise (Riverside, CA), February 
23, 2004, at A10. 
 7. Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 221, 222-23 
(2004).  Over 6,500 employees lost their jobs and pensions while Enron executives 
awarded themselves $55 million in bonuses.  Id. 
 8. Robert Manor & Howard Witt, Lay Charged with Massive Conspiracy; Ex-
Enron CEO Pleads Innocent, Chicago Tribune, July 9, 2004, at C1. 
 9. Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 917, 
919-21 (2003).  Andersen’s Enron team shredded Enron-related documents until 
the company had been “officially served” by the SEC.  Under SEC rules, a felony 
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closed its public auditing practice in August 2002, reducing 
its workforce from 28,000 U.S.-based partners and 
employees to fewer than 3,000.10 
Many other major American corporations also 
misrepresented their finances, inflating earnings and 
assets, and concealing and mischaracterizing expenses.  
These included other energy companies,11 including 
Dynergy.  The disclosure of Dynergy’s use of fictive “round 
trip” energy trades to create an appearance of active 
trading resulted in losses estimated at $100 million.12  
Technology and communications companies,13 including 
Adelphia Communications,14 WorldCom,15 and Global 
 
conviction disqualifies a company from auditing public companies unless the firm 
receives a waiver. 
 10. Id. at 917 n.1.  The principle function of its remaining operation is winding 
up its business affairs. 
 11. Royal Dutch/Shell Group, the world’s third largest oil company, reduced 
its estimates of its proven reserves of oil and natural gas by 20 percent, or 3.9 
billion barrels, nearly two years after internal documents suggest that top 
executives may have known about the overstatement.  Stephen Labaton & Jeff 
Gerth, At Shell, New Accounting and Rosier Oil Outlook, N.Y. Times, March 12, 
2004, at A1.  In May 2004, El Paso Corporation announced that it would reduce 
its estimates of proven oil and natural gas reserves by 41 percent, or 1.8 trillion 
cubic feet, because several employees had deliberately overstated its reserves.  
Heather Timmons, El Paso Says Reserves May Have Been Falsified, N.Y. Times, 
May 4, 2004, at C14.  Reliant Energy and four corporate officials were indicted for 
illegal activities during the California energy crisis in 2000, when the corporation 
allegedly executed illegal “round trip” trades in which the same electricity would 
be bought and sold at the same price, creating the illusion of trading activity to 
artificially increase the price of electricity.  Former Reliant Electricity Trader 
Agrees to $25,000 Fine, Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2004, at C2. 
 12. Simon Romero, Stiff Sentence Is Possibility for a Name Not so Known, 
N.Y. Times, March 24, 2004, at C1.  Prosecutors reached this estimate by 
measuring the decline in Dynergy’s stock—from $56.99 in April 2001 to $0.86 in 
August 2002. 
 13. In April 2004, Computer Associates, the fourth largest independent 
software company with 16,000 employees and more than $3 billion in sales, 
acknowledged that it had backdated $1.8 billion in contracts in the fiscal year 
ended March 2000, which amounted to nearly 30 percent of its total sales that 
year.  Although the investigation is ongoing, four former executives have already 
pleaded guilty to securities fraud or obstruction of justice.  Alex Berenson, 
Computer Associates Restates Timing of $2.2 Billion in Sales, N.Y. Times, April 
27, 2004, at C1. 
 14. In March 2002, Adelphia, the sixth largest cable operation in the United 
States, disclosed that company assets had been used as collateral for $2.3 billion 
in secret loans to company executives who had artificially inflated earnings, 
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Crossing16 also suffered massive losses when their 
fraudulent accounting practices were revealed.  In the 
health care industry, HealthSouth, the nation’s largest 
operator of rehabilitation hospitals and surgery centers, 
engaged in an accounting fraud that inflated earnings and 
assets by as much as $4.6 billion in order to meet Wall 
Street forecasts.17 
Major European corporations also employed similar 
deceptive practices.  Parmalat (a dairy-food giant which 
was the eighth largest industrial group in Italy and 
represented .8% of the country’s GDP18) collapsed in late 
2003 after the revelation that it had falsified its earning 
reports for thirteen years, while it was losing billions of 
dollars, and claimed assets in a bank account that did not 
exist.19  Furthermore, nearly 4 billion Euros in market 
value was lost after the disclosure that Royal Ahold,20 a 
 
hidden billions of dollars of debt, and improperly inflated subscriber numbers to 
artificially improve its financial standing.  The founder of Adelphia and its chief 
financial officer have been convicted of conspiracy, bank fraud, and securities 
fraud.  Barry Meier, 2 Guilty in Fraud at a Cable Giant, New York Times, July 9, 
2004, at A1.  To date, no criminal charges have been filed against the company.  
Carrie Johnson, Trial Against Adelphia Executives to Open; Father, 2 Sons Face 
Criminal Charges in Wide-Ranging Fraud Investigation, The Washington Post, 
February 23, 2004, at A05. 
 15. In 2002, WorldCom announced a multi-billion dollar second-quarter 
charge to write down some acquired operations and subsequently revealed 
fraudulent accounting practices that had improperly classified $3.8 billion in 
ordinary expenses as capital expenditures.  In March 2004, WorldCom reduced its 
combined pretax profits for 2000 and 2001 by $74.4 billion.  Although charges 
have been filed against company executives, to date, no criminal charges have 
been filed against the company.  WorldCom Restates Profits by $74.4 Billion for 2 
Years, N.Y. Times, March 13, 2004, at C14. 
 16. In 2002, Global Crossing collapsed under $12.4 billion in debt.  The 
company allegedly counted the telecom capacity it sold to other 
telecommunications firms as revenue but failed to list as an ordinary expense the 
cost of buying capacity from others.  No charges were filed against the company or 
its executives.  Singapore Group Takes Global Crossing out of Bankruptcy, 
Channel NewsAsia, December 10, 2003. 
 17. Brickey, supra note 7, at 222-23.  By May 2003, fourteen executives were 
investigated and the CEO was indicted in November 2003.  Id. 
 18. Sophie Arie, Parmalat Dream Goes Sour, The Observer, January 4, 2004, 
at 3. 
 19. Gail Edmondson & Laura Cohn, How Parmalat Went Sour, Business 
Week, January 12, 2004, at 46. 
 20. Gregory Crouch & Sherri Day, Another Ahold Executive Resigns in Wake 
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Dutch company that had been the world’s third largest food 
retailer,21 had overstated its earnings by more than a 
billion dollars.22 
Other corporate wrongdoing involved breaches of 
environmental or health and safety laws.  Three major 
cruise lines—Carnival, Norwegian, and Royal Caribbean—
pleaded guilty to charges involving the dumping of waste 
oil, dry cleaning chemicals, and other toxic substances, and 
falsifying records to conceal this conduct.23  Smaller 
domestic companies violated the Clean Water Act by 
discharging wastewater into sewers, surface waters, and 
wetlands.24  Olympic Pipe Line Co. was convicted of 
violating the 1979 Pipeline Safety Act as a result of a 
pipeline rupture that killed three people in a park in 
Washington.25  Virtually all of the major pharmaceutical 
companies are being investigated or have settled or plead 
guilty to charges of serious misconduct.  Pfizer, the world’s 
largest pharmaceutical company, plead guilty and agreed 
to pay $430 million to resolve criminal and civil charges 
that it paid doctors to prescribe an epilepsy drug to 
patients with ailments that the drug was not federally 
approved to treat,26 despite a study showing the drug was 
 
of Scandal, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2003, at C5. 
 21. Dutch Grocer Tries for New Start with Write-Down, N.Y. Times, October 
3, 2003, at W1. 
 22. Gregory Couch, At Ahold, Past Errors Shadow the Future, N.Y. Times, 
November 25, 2003, at W1. 
 23. Marilyn Adams, Cruise Ship Dumping Poisons Seas, Frustrates U.S. 
Enforcers, USA Today, November 8, 2002, at 1A. 
 24. PQ corporation improperly discharged wastewater into public sewers and 
surface waters and was ordered to pay a total of $557,000 in fines and restitution 
to the areas affected and will also pay $50,000 to fund community service 
projects.  Also, Keystone Insulator-Cleaner, Inc. and its owner were indicted on 
one charge of conspiring to violate the Clean Water Act and two charges of 
violating the Clean Water Act by dumping wastes into wetlands located on 
McNally’s property.  Environmental Protection Agency Enforcement Wrap-Up, 
U.S. Newswire, May 25, 2004. 
 25. Carolyn Nielsen, Issues Remain in Pipeline Case, The Bellingham Herald 
(Bellingham, WA), December 22, 2002, at 5B. 
 26. Christopher Bowe, Pfizer to Pay $430 Million for Drug Fraud, Finacial 
Times (London), May 14, 2004, at 20.  This amount is the second largest criminal 
fine ever levied for healthcare fraud prosecution.  Of the total, $240 million was 
assessed as a criminal fine and $190 million was assessed as a civil fine.  Also, the 
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no more effective than a placebo in treating other 
disorders.27  British pharmaceutical manufacturer 
AstraZeneca paid a total of $355 million, including a 
criminal fine of $64 million, to settle accusations of fraud 
against Medicare concerning a prostate cancer drug.28  
Bayer has paid $271 million and GlaxoSmithKline has paid 
more than $86 million to settle allegations that they 
relabeled drugs to mislead Medicaid officials.29  Abbott 
Laboratories paid more than $622 million to settle an 
investigation into its marketing practices.30  Finally, 
Schering-Plough Corporation is under investigation of its 
marketing practices as well as allegations that employees 
destroyed documents related to the case.31 
At least one U.S. corporation has an extensive record 
of violations causing injuries and deaths.  McWane, Inc., a 
privately held company with approximately 5,000 
employees, is one of the world’s largest manufacturers of 
cast-iron sewer and water pipe.32  Since 1995, at least 4,600 
injuries have been recorded in McWane foundries,33 
 
fines were for activities conducted by Warner-Lambert before that company was 
purchased by Pfizer in 2000. 
 27. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer to Pay $430 Million over Promoting Drug to 
Doctors, N.Y. Times, May 14, 2004, at C1.  Nearly 90 percent of the drug’s sales 
continue to be for ailments for which the drug is not an approved treatment.  The 
company also illegally promoted the drug as treatment for Lou Gehrig’s disease, 
attention deficit disorder, restless leg syndrome, and drug and alcohol withdrawal 
seizures. 
 28. Melody Petersen, AstraZeneca Pleads Guilty in Cancer Medicine Scheme, 
N.Y. Times, Saturday, June 21, 2003, at C1. 
 29. Two More States in AWP Fray; One Seeks Damages Related to Old 
Federal Cases, Pharmaceutical Corporate Compliance Report, March 16, 2004, at 
Vol. 2, No. 6. 
 30. Gardiner Harris, Abbott to Pay $622 Million to End Inquiry into 
Marketing, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2003, at C1. 
 31. Melody Petersen, Indictment Seen By Drug Maker Over Marketing, N.Y. 
Times Online, May 31, 2003, at A1 (late edition).  If any company is convicted of a 
felony involving health care fraud, the government could seek to bar its 
prescription drugs from the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
 32. David Barstow, & Lowell Bergman, Criminal Inquiry Under Way at Large 
Pipe Manufacturer, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2003, at A1. 
 33. David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, At a Texas Foundry, an Indifference to 
Life, N.Y. Times, January 8, 2003, at A1.  At one plant in Texas, a report issued 
by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration stated, “Workers 
are covered with black residue from the foundry sand.  Many work areas are 
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including ten deaths.34  McWane has been cited for 
hundreds of safety and environmental violations stemming 
from management’s cost cutting efforts.35  It has been 
convicted in the state courts of New York and Texas, has 
deliberately ignored and willfully violated OSHA safety 
rules, and now faces additional charges of health and safety 
violations.36  As of May 2003, McWane had paid 
approximately $10 million in fines.37 
The prevalence of serious corporate malfeasance 
highlights the importance of legal regimes that respond 
to—and may prevent or deter—corporate wrongdoing.  
Western Europeans nations use a variety of administrative, 
civil, and criminal laws to address corporate misconduct.  
In this article, we focus on corporate criminal liability 
without meaning to underplay the importance of other 
mechanisms.  Section I describes the academic criticisms 
and defenses of corporate criminal liability in the American 
legal literature.  Section II reviews the development of 
corporate criminal liability in Western Europe.  Section III 
considers the nature of the developments noted in Western 
Europe, and explores their implications for the United 
States.  Although there has been much discussion 
regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s impact in the United 
States and even in Europe, it is not the subject of our 
review, because expanded criminal liability under 
Sarbanes-Oxley is targeted primarily at corporate officers 
and directors rather than at the corporate entity itself.38  In 
 
dark, due to poor lighting and clouds of sand.  Despite all the ignition and fuel 
sources, exit paths are not obvious.” 
 34. Robin Stein, Worker is Crushed to Death at Troubled Foundry Upstate, 
N.Y. Times, February 21, 2004, B5. 
 35. Barstow & Bergman, supra note 33, at A1. 
 36. David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, Deaths on the Job, Slaps on the Wrist, 
N.Y. Times, January 10, 2003, at A1.  The company has also been indicted in New 
Jersey and Alabama for environmental crimes.  Andrew Dunn, McWane Accused 
of Pollution, Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), May 27, 2004, at E3. 
 37. Barstow & Bergman, supra, note 33, at A1. 
 38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348-1350; U.S. Sentencing Commission Supplement to 
the 2002 Guidelines Manual §2B1.1 (2003).  It should be noted, however, that in 
response to Sarbanes-Oxley, which directed the Sentencing Commission to re-
examine the guidelines governing corporate offenders, the Sentencing 
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this article, we focus on justifications for imposing criminal 
liability on the corporate entity as opposed to its officers 
and directors.  We do not address here the question, posed 
by some law and economics scholars, of whether economic 
offenses should be criminalized in the first place. 
I.  CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES TOWARD CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Corporate criminal liability has become controversial 
in the United States.  Several different critiques have been 
offered.  Some critics begin from a retributive view of the 
function of criminal law, others from a utilitarian 
perspective.  Most of the utilitarian analysis focuses 
directly on the efficiency of using criminal sanctions on the 
corporate entity, though a closely related strand connects 
these arguments to public choice theory.  Although the 
critics do not agree on first principles, they concur in the 
conclusion that corporations should be sanctioned 
(exclusively or in all but exceptional cases) in civil rather 
than criminal proceedings.  Other scholars defend 
corporate criminal liability, some on the ground of the 
expressive function or social meaning that attaches to 
criminal law, and others on more pragmatic grounds such 
as the resources available for the enforcement of criminal 
law. 
A. The Retributive Critique of Corporate Criminal Liability 
One line of criticism asserts that the traditional forms 
and functions of criminal law should not be applied to 
juridical persons, because they cannot in any meaningful 
sense be said to have mens rea or to be “guilty” of a 
 
Commission amended the guidelines, effective November 1, 2004, to impose 
stricter criteria for corporate compliance programs.  See Amendments to the 
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 2.  These amendments are relevant to our 
comparative review of sanctions imposed on corporate offenders.  See infra note 
300 and accompanying text. 
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criminal offense.39  Imposing criminal liability on a 
corporate entity requires resort to the principles of 
respondeat superior, rather than individual responsibility, 
which is the hallmark of the criminal law.  Accordingly, 
using the criminal justice system to convict or punish a 
corporation is undesirable because it obscures the moral 
content of criminal liability.40  This critique is consistent 
with a retributivist or desert-based view of the function of 
criminal law, which imposes punishment on the basis of 
the offender’s moral blameworthiness, in order to respond 
to the wrong manifest in the criminal conduct.41 
B. The Law and Economics Efficiency Critique 
Another line of criticism of corporate criminal liability 
is founded on a law and economics perspective and a 
utilitarian view of the function of criminal law.  Assuming 
for our purposes the efficacy of using the criminal law in 
some instances to regulate economic conduct—an 
 
 39. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Legal Stud. 
319, 320 (1996) (“Corporations are legal fictions, and legal fictions cannot commit 
criminal acts.  Nor can they possess mens rea, a guilty state of mind.”); Paul H. 
Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. 
Rev. 201, 211 n.40 (1996).  See also V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault 
a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 355, 356 
(1999) (advocating corporate criminal liability based upon negligence or strict 
liability because of the incoherence of the concept of corporate mens rea). 
 40. John Baker, Corporations Aren’t Criminals, Wall St. Journal, April 22, 
2002, at A3 (corporate criminal liability “ignores the moral basis on which 
substantive criminal law rests—the requirement that a defendant be personally 
responsible for his actions”); Paul H. Robinson, The Practice of Restorative 
Justice: The Virtues of Restorative Process, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 
2003 Utah L. Rev. 375, 384-85 (extending criminal liability to corporations “risks 
obscuring the moral content of criminal liability”).  David Skeel and William 
Stuntz have cautioned that if criminal law is expanded to cover more technical 
violations, trials—which by their nature tend to focus on behavior on the outer 
edge of criminal liability, rather than the core—will increasingly deal with 
technicalities and trivialize the criminal law.  David Skeel & William Stuntz, 
Another Attempt to Legislate Corporate Honesty, N.Y. Times, July 10, 2002, at 
A21. 
 41. Cf. Robinson, supra note 39, at 210-11 (using a retributive-desert model to 
analyze the expansion of criminal sanctions to cover behavior traditionally the 
subject of civil law). 
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assumption obviously not accepted by all law and 
economics scholars—the law and economics critique focuses 
on whether criminal sanctions are the most efficient 
response to corporate misconduct.  Law and economics 
scholars believe that civil entity liability is a more efficient 
response, or that individual liability (either civil or 
criminal) is preferable to entity liability. 
In general, law and economics scholars have agreed 
that criminal sanctions are not an efficient response to 
corporate misconduct, though they have reached that 
conclusion based upon different—and in some cases 
inconsistent—reasoning.  One line of critique sees criminal 
sanctions as too powerful.  Because criminal sanctions are 
so potent, they tend to overdeter, inducing enterprises to 
spend more resources on monitoring and compliance than 
is socially useful.42  According to this account, civil 
sanctions can be more precisely calibrated, and hence more 
efficient at matching the costs of compliance with the 
expected social benefit.43  (Additionally, if sanctions are 
large enough to be meaningful, they will tend to have a 
spillover effect, injuring relatively blameless shareholders 
and employees.44) 
Law and economics theorists have also focused on two 
distinctive attributes of criminal liability: procedural 
requirements and the reputational effects of conviction.  Law 
and economic analysis treats the heightened procedural 
requirements in criminal proceedings (such as proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, trial by jury, and double jeopardy) as 
increased transaction costs.  Since a corporation cannot be 
imprisoned, both civil and criminal proceedings generally 
 
 42. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 39, at 321.  See also Bruce H. Kobayashi, 
Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal 
Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
715, 744 (2001) (concluding that increased enforcement of antitrust laws under 
the Clinton Administration probably caused corporations to take too many 
precautions ex ante and thus made the system less efficient). 
 43. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 39, at 321. 
 44. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. 
Rev. 386, 386-87 & n.4 (1981). 
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result in monetary penalties, and law and economic scholars 
question whether the increased transaction costs of the 
criminal process can be justified.45  Criminal conviction also 
imposes a stigma or reputational penalty.46  Law and 
economics scholars have expressed a variety of concerns 
regarding the reputational damage that criminal charges 
and criminal convictions can impose upon corporations.47  On 
the one hand, there is concern that a corporation may suffer 
unjustified reputational harm if it is convicted of a relatively 
minor criminal charge.48  On the other hand, in the case of 
the most serious offenses, reputational harm may be 
warranted, but in such cases the nature of the facts may 
speak for themselves, creating a public outcry, to which 
criminal charges add little or nothing.49  By this reasoning, 
reputational harm is either unnecessary or excessive.  
Indeed, reputational sanctions may have a perverse quality.  
They are most effective when applied to firms with good 
reputations, and they are ineffective if a firm has not yet 
created, or has already lost, its positive reputation.50  Thus 
firms whose general conduct has been exemplary will suffer 
the greatest reputational damage from criminal charges, 
and bad corporate actors will be immune from reputational 
 
 45. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 
109 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1512-20 (1996) (noting, however, that where sanctions 
are high and legal standards uncertain, the greater procedural protections 
afforded by the criminal process may be warranted). 
 46. Although the scholarship generally treats the existence of this 
reputational effect as a given, there has been surprisingly little effort to establish 
its existence empirically.  One study found no effect on share prices of news 
reports of civil charges and settlements of fraud charges compared with reports of 
malum prohibitum criminal charges.  See Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, 
Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 395, 413-15 
(1991). 
 47. The literature also contains an interesting discussion of the impact of the 
“rub off” effect of reputational penalties on corporate officers, managers, and 
other employees.  V.S. Khanna has defined a set of criteria that define the 
circumstances under which such rub off penalties are warranted and effective.  
Khanna, supra note 45, at 1509-12.  See also Fischel & Sykes, supra note 39, at 
342 (discussing rub off penalties in the context of Michael Milken and Drexel 
Burnham Lambert). 
 48. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 39, at 332. 
 49. Khanna, supra note 45, at 1509. 
 50. Id. at 1500. 
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sanctions.  Moreover, the reputational loss to a firm that has 
been convicted of criminal conduct, unlike a civil judgment 
awarding monetary damages, does not provide a reciprocal 
gain to any injured party.51  It is thus far less efficient than a 
sanction that provides such a benefit.52  It should be noted, 
however, that from an efficiency perspective, the 
reputational effects of criminal charges do provide two 
related benefits to the prosecution.  Reputational effects 
ensue immediately when charges are filed, and accordingly 
they impose pressure on firms (as well as individuals) to 
engage in rapid plea discussions to limit the reputational 
damage.53  Of course these benefits to the prosecution may 
be deemed undesirable from a broader social vantage point, 
since they impose a penalty with few procedural protections, 
and may create undue pressure on a corporation to plead 
guilty even to unfounded charges in order to reduce the 
impact of the negative publicity that occurs throughout 
criminal proceedings. 
C. The Public Choice Critique 
In contrast to the traditional law and economics 
analysis—which assumes criminal sanctions are unduly 
severe, inflicting unjustified, excessive, and sometimes 
perverse costs on corporations and their officers, 
shareholders, and employees—a more recent critique has 
suggested that imposing criminal sanctions on a corporation 
is actually the least costly penalty from the firm’s point of 
view, raising the concern that criminal liability may 
underdeter corporate misconduct.54  This new argument is 
 
 51. Id. at 1503, 1505. 
 52. Law and economics scholars have made a similar argument in favor of 
using criminal fines rather than imprisonment whenever possible, because fines 
return resources to the public (and allow the defendant to remain self supporting 
and productive), but imprisonment imposes substantial costs.  See, e.g., Richard 
A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
409, 409-11 (1980); Joel Waldfogel, Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently?  
Evidence on Federal Fraud Offenders, 38 J.L. & Econ. 107, 107 (1995). 
 53. Khanna, supra note 45, at 1505-08. 
 54. V.S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy 
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based on public choice theory and its recognition of the 
important role interest groups play in the legislative 
process,55 and on the observation that in several instances 
corporate interests have opposed the expansion of corporate 
criminal liability less vigorously than enhanced civil liability 
for corporate entities or criminal liability for corporate 
officers and agents.56  Given the political power wielded by 
corporate interests, their relatively muted opposition to 
corporate criminal liability suggests that they view criminal 
penalties as less problematic than other sanctions. 
In addition, the public choice analysis incorporates 
many of the arguments described above regarding the 
relative inefficiency of criminal sanctions, but instead of 
concluding that criminal sanctions overdeter corporate 
economic activity, it concludes that they may underdeter 
corporate misconduct.  As compared with enforcement 
through private civil actions, criminal enforcement has 
typically been thin,57 and criminal fines often less than civil 
penalties.58  Moreover, since only the government can 
enforce criminal laws, corporate interests can later lobby 
below the political radar to limit enforcement by limiting 
the enforcement budget.59  Finally, in criminal proceedings 
the government must meet additional procedural and 
substantive hurdles.  For these and other reasons, 
corporate interests may see the creation or expansion of 
corporate criminal liability as the lesser evil at times when 
 
Analysis, Discussion Paper No. 03-012, University of Michigan John N. Ohlin 
Center for Law and Economics (2003), available at 
http://www.law.umich.edu/CentersAndPrograms/olin/papers.htm#2003 at 3, 46.  
For a general application of public choice theory to criminal legislation, see 
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 
505 (2001). 
 55. For a general discussion of interest groups and public choice theory, see 
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical 
Introduction 12-37 (1991). 
 56. Khanna, supra note 54, at 21-23 (discussing the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and Sarbanes-
Oxley). 
 57. Id. at 12-13. 
 58. Id. at 13-14. 
 59. Id. at 8 n.40, 17-18. 
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the pubic demands legislative action to respond to 
corporate wrongdoing.60  According to this analysis, 
corporate interests will more strenuously oppose more 
effective legislation creating civil liability for corporations, 
or criminal liability for corporate officers, directors, and 
management, and corporate criminal liability may be 
enacted as a substitute for more effective laws.  Thus the 
enactment of corporate criminal liability may actually have 
the perverse effect of underdeterring corporate misconduct. 
D. Defenses of Corporate Criminal Liability 
Despite the range of criticisms, corporate criminal 
liability also has its American defenders.  Since heightened 
procedural protections plainly do impose some additional 
procedural costs, many advocates of employing criminal 
liability base their arguments on the distinctive functions of 
criminal law.  Some scholarly defenses of criminal liability 
for corporations focus on the expressive function of criminal 
law, and reason that criminal sanctions are necessary to 
respond to corporate wrongdoing that denigrates the value 
of the persons and interests injured by corporate 
wrongdoing.61  Similarly, a social meaning analysis 
emphasizes that criminal law expresses society’s 
condemnation of prohibited activities.62  Replacing corporate 
criminal liability with civil liability conveys the message 
that the right to engage in prohibited activities can be 
purchased; only corporate criminal liability can provide both 
the incentives necessary to prevent crime and a vehicle for 
 
 60. See id. at 19 (arguing that corporate interests would prefer criminal 
liability, with its heightened procedures, over civil liability); see id. at 21-22 
(noting successful passage of Sarbanes-Oxley after major corporate accounting 
scandals but unsuccessful attempt post-Enron to repeal recent limitations on 
private securities actions). 
 61. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 833, 858 (2000).  But see Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the 
Behavior of  Top Management Matter?, 91 Geo. L.J. 1215, 1218 (2003) (suggesting 
that expressive considerations can be furthered by other, less socially costly, 
forms of liability). 
 62. Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. 
Legal Stud. 609, 617 (1998). 
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the message that certain activities are prohibited and 
variances cannot be purchased.63 
Using the criminal justice system to respond to 
corporate misconduct also has pragmatic advantages.  
There is no comprehensive civil counterpart to the 
extensive network of federal and state prosecutors and 
investigators who make up the “great infrastructure of 
criminal law enforcers.”64  If corporations cannot be held 
liable for criminal conduct, this infrastructure will be 
unavailable to investigate corporate wrongdoing, and there 
may not be adequate resources for administrative and civil 
enforcement.65  There are also some procedural advantages.  
Although criminal procedure provides defendants with 
heightened procedural rights, it also provides a significant 
advantage to the government, particularly the power of 
investigative grand juries.66  Additionally, the greater speed 
with which criminal charges are generally resolved67 means 
that they can bring speedier restitution to victims.68  
Corporate criminal liability can also provide a basis for 
desirable sanctions other than monetary fines, such as 
equity fines and corporate probation.69 
To provide a new lens through which to illuminate the 
debate about the legitimacy of corporate criminal liability 
in American law, we turn now to the recent developments 
in Europe. 
 
 63. Id. at 619. 
 64. Coffee, supra note 44, at 447. 
 65. Id. at 447-48. 
 66. For a general introduction to the grand jury, see Sara Sun Beale et al., 
Grand Jury Law and Practice (2d ed. 1997). 
 67. Criminal cases receive priority because of the constitutional and statutory 
guarantees of the right to a speedy trial.  See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing 
Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & 
Soc. Sci. 39, 46-48, 50 (1996) (noting that increases in the criminal caseload 
required federal courts to give priority to criminal trials to avoid speedy trial 
dismissals; this forced more civil cases off the trial docket and into alternative 
dispute resolution). 
 68. Coffee, supra note 44, at 447. 
 69. Id. at 448-59. 
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II. THE DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE 
While the preceding philosophical and policy debate 
has been occurring in the United States, a debate of a 
different kind has been occurring in Western European 
countries.  Other than Great Britain (which, by the 1950s, 
had adopted a more limited form of the respondeat superior 
theory of American corporate criminal liability70), Western 
European legal systems fundamentally resisted the 
imposition of criminal liability on legal entities throughout 
most of the last century.71  This opposition was expressed in 
the principle societas delinquere non potest, that is, a legal 
entity cannot be blameworthy.72 
In this section we describe a fundamental shift in the 
European approach, and the widespread (though not 
uniform) adoption of corporate criminal liability.  In part A 
of this section, we will briefly describe some of the events 
that drew attention to the issue of corporate criminal 
liability in Western Europe.  Then, in part B, we will 
highlight some of the recent legislative developments 
imposing corporate criminal liability in the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland.  In parts C and D, we 
will discuss developments and continued debate in France 
and Germany, respectively, since they are two of the most 
 
 70. John C. Coffee, Corporate Criminal Liability: An Introduction and 
Comparative Survey, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, 
9, 11-12, 14 (Albin Eser et al. eds., 1999); L.H. Leigh, The Criminal Liability of 
Corporations and Other Groups: A Comparative View, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1508, 
1510-11 (1981). 
 71. The exception was Denmark, which has recognized corporate criminal 
liability for certain offenses since 1926.  See Coffee, supra note 70, at 24.  In 1996, 
a statutory framework for corporate criminal liability was included in the Danish 
criminal code.  Gorm Toftegaard Nielsen, Criminal Liability of Collective 
Entities—the Danish Model, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective 
Entities, supra note 70, at 189, 190. 
 72. See Günter Heine, New Developments in Corporate Criminal Law 
Liability in Europe: Can Europeans Learn from the American Experience—Or 
Vice Versa?, 1998 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic L.J. 173, 174 (1998); Leigh, 
supra note 70, at 1509; Mireille Delmas-Marty, Les Conditions de fond de mise en 
jeu de la responsibilité pénale, 111 Revue des Sociétés (Dalloz, April-June 1993) 
at 301. 
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significant civil law systems in Western Europe.73  In 
addition, we will focus in more depth on the new French 
law imposing corporate criminal liability for another 
reason: as best we can determine, France’s new law is more 
comprehensive than other statutory schemes, particularly 
in its provision of extensive non-monetary sanctions.  
Although we have not canvassed all other developments in 
Western European countries, we note that Belgium, 
Norway, and Portugal have also introduced varying 
degrees of corporate criminal liability.74  Spain and Italy, 
however, continue to resist imposing full corporate criminal 
liability, but like Germany, they have imposed quasi-
criminal administrative liability.75 
 
 73. “Traditionally, France has been considered ‘the motherland of modern 
codification, and the Napoleonic Code Pénal is the most widely followed penal 
code in the world.’”  Leonard Orland & Charles Cachera, Corporate Crime and 
Punishment in France: Criminal Responsibility of Legal Entities (Personnes 
Morales) Under the New French Criminal Code (Nouveau Code Pénal), 11 Conn. 
J. Int’l L. 111, 113 (1995) (quoting Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Foreward to 1 The 
French Penal Code xiii (Gerhard O.W. Mueller ed., Jean F. Moreau & Gerhard 
O.W. Mueller trans., 1960)).  German criminal law theory has “widespread 
influence in the civil law world,” affecting many European countries, as well as 
Latin American and Asian nations.  Markus Dirk Dubber, The Promise of 
German Criminal Law at 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with author, Feb. 22, 
2004). 
 74. Portugal imposed vicarious agency liability in the areas of economic and 
environmental crimes.  Coffee, supra note 70, at 24.  Norway established 
corporate criminal liability for certain offenses, but there is very little English 
commentary on Norwegian developments.  Heine, supra note 72, at 175; Manfred 
Möhrenschlager, National and International Developments, in Criminal 
Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 89, 91.  Finally, 
on May 4, 1999, the Belgium parliament surprised some observers by adopting 
criminal liability for corporations.  Under the new law, according to one observer, 
“the legal entity is considered criminally liable for crimes which are connected to 
the purpose of the legal entity or which have been committed in its interest or for 
its account.”  Michael G. Faure, Criminal Responsibilities of Legal and Collective 
Entities: Developments in Belgium, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and 
Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 105, 111.  In contrast to the French law and 
other proposals discussed later in this section that preserve individual criminal 
liability, the Belgian law, according to Faure, “excludes the liability of the 
individual person, unless the latter knowingly committed a fault,” when the 
corporation is liable.  Id. 
 75. In Italy and Spain, legislatures increasingly imposed quasi-criminal 
administrative sanctions on corporations to “confront the growing power of 
economic enterprises.”  See Heine, supra note 72, at 174; C.E. Paliero, Criminal 
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Finally, in part E, we will highlight some proposals of 
two transnational European organizations, the Council of 
Europe and the European Union.  Although member states 
have not embraced wholeheartedly the proposals for 
criminalizing certain corporate conduct in social and 
economic fields, those proposals are still significant.  As 
reflections of the views of representatives of member state 
governments, these proposals may signal the direction of 
future policy in the member states and influence legislative 
initiatives in those states. 
A. Western European Scholars Confront the Need for 
Corporate Criminal Liability 
By the late 1970s, legal scholars and commentators in 
Western Europe were increasingly challenging the viability 
of the principle of societas delinquere non potest, believing 
that the subject of the criminal responsibility of 
corporations could not be avoided.76  This was driven, 
 
Liability of Corporations—Italy, in Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth 
International Congress of Comparative Law 251, 265 (Hans de Doelder & Klaus 
Tiedemann eds., 1996 Kluwer Law International) (noting that since 1981, “the 
principles behind and the structure of administrative torts have been closely 
connected to the criminal model which is today so well known in Europe, the 
modern prototype of which is to be found in the German Ordnungswidrigkeiten”).  
In Italy, movement toward corporate criminal liability faces a fundamental 
obstacle, namely, the constitutional prescription that “criminal liability is 
personal.”  Id. at 253 (citing art. 27, ¶ 1, of the Italian Constitution).  A strict 
reading of this clause to require individual culpability was re-affirmed in 1988 by 
Italy’s Constitutional Court.  Id. at 255, 258-59.  Nevertheless, as Paliero notes, 
this decision has not deterred scholars from continuing to explore possible models 
for corporate liability, especially since there is a wide consensus that the “more 
invasive activities of companies and corporations” cannot be controlled without 
punitive sanctions.  Id. at 261, 259-71.  Paliero further argues that corporations 
have “interests which are distinct from those of physical persons,” and therefore 
are capable of committing criminal offenses.  Id. at 257.  Another Italian scholar 
has also argued for the development of corporate criminal liability: “The classical 
construction of criminal offences based on a human scale is increasingly unable to 
deal with the emergence of new, collective or complex entities, the latter of which 
prevail ever more in the most characteristic sectors of modern crime, for example, 
organized and economic crime.”  Vincenzo Militello, The Basis for Criminal 
Responsibility of Collective Entities in Italy, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal 
and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 181, 181. 
 76. Klaus Tiedemann, Introductory Note, in Criminal Liability of 
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primarily, by the increasing economic influence of 
corporations in Western Europe77 and the unique threats 
posed to society from unregulated corporate misconduct in 
such areas as consumer markets and the environment.78  
Corporate misconduct was viewed as a new form of 
“delinquency” worthy of criminal sanction.79  As a 
consequence, some commentators were willing to conceive 
that the corporation itself had its own personality and was 
capable of being imprinted with criminal 
blameworthiness,80 even if the concept of inflicting 
punishment on a corporation posed its own conundrum.81 
In France, the largest of the civil law Western 
European countries to have adopted comprehensive 
 
Corporations, XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law, supra note 75, 
at 1, 1 (noting academic conferences organized to address the “criminal liability of 
enterprises,” including the 10th International Congress of Comparative Law in 
Brussels in 1978, International Centre of sociological, criminal and penitentiary 
research and studies in Messine in 1979, and the meeting of German, Austrian 
and Swiss professors of criminal law in Basel in 1993). 
 77. Leigh, supra note 70, at 1508-09. 
 78. Klaus Tiedemann, Rapport général, in Criminal Liability of Corporations, 
in Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth International Congress of 
Comparative Law, supra note 75, at 11, 14.  See Günter Heine, Criminal Liability 
of Enterprises and New Risks: International Developments, National 
Consequences, 2 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 107, 108 
(1995) (noting that corporations in Western Europe do not face serious sanctions 
for environmental harm caused by their conduct). 
 79. Tiedemann, supra note 78, at 14. 
 80. Id. at 25.  Tiedemann notes that corporations were increasingly regarded 
as creating a climate which encouraged the commission of offenses on behalf of 
the corporation by its representatives.  Id. at 14.  Cf. Heine, supra note 78, at 107 
(“The international trend is towards imposing criminal liability on the enterprise, 
increasingly independent of proof of misconduct by a particular individual.”). 
 81. See Tiedemann, supra note 78, at 15-18 (discussing the effectiveness of 
monetary and non-monetary sanctions in both the civil and criminal context in 
Western Europe); Heine, supra note 78, at 110 (“. . . a continuing lessening of the 
parameters of criminal responsibility would lead to a liability which is no longer 
of great consequence to anyone. . . .  Even exclusively deterrent considerations 
face special difficulties when it is a question of determining guilt and imposing 
criminal sanctions in connection with entrepreneurial activity.”).  Cf. Leigh, supra 
note 70, at 1526 (“Scholars who advocate reform in Europe wish to have the 
power not only to fine a corporation, but also to subject it to other measures, for 
example, closure of premises, disqualification from pursuing a professional 
activity, confiscation, and more original still, placing the corporation under 
judicial supervision.  Dissolution has also been envisaged.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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corporate criminal liability to date,82 there was an 
increasing sense that economically powerful entities that 
existed due to the state’s “patrimony” should also be 
responsible to society for their conduct.83  Discussion about 
the use of criminal and administrative sanctions to 
regulate corporate conduct continued among legislative 
reformers and legal commentators in France throughout 
the 1980s.84  During this period, the French confronted the 
consequences of unregulated corporate activities, including 
the growth in the power of multinational corporations and 
their ability to evade local regulatory requirements,85 
notorious corporate fault, such as the case involving the 
sale of blood tainted with the HIV virus by national 
agencies responsible for the collection and distribution of 
 
 82. On July 22,1992, the French legislature passed the Nouveau Code Pénal, 
which constituted a comprehensive revision of the French criminal code.  One of 
the innovations in the new penal code were provisions imposing corporate 
criminal liability, which became effective on March 1, 1994.  Bernard Bouloc, La 
Criminalisation du Comportement Collectif–France, in Criminal Liability of 
Corporations, XIVth International Congress of Comparative Law, supra note 75, 
at 235, 237. 
 83. Id. at 236-37. 
 84. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 121-22 (noting 1978 and 1986 
attempts to pass legislation in France on corporate liability before passage in 
1992 of the new penal code). 
By the 1980s, French law imposed quasi-criminal liability on corporations 
for offenses concerning tax fraud, foreign exchange offenses, price-fixing, and, in 
narrow circumstances, worker safety.  See Leigh, supra note 70, at 1520.  This 
liability appears to be administrative in nature, although Leigh characterizes it 
as criminal.  We are not aware of any French commentator who has suggested 
that formal corporate criminal liability existed before the adoption of the 1992 
new French penal code.  Moreover, Leigh’s piece notes that while the French 
government imposed “criminal responsibility” on corporations operating as cartels 
or abusing dominant market positions by the early 1980s, French academics 
argued that the French government “limited itself to administrative sanctions,” 
and was reluctant “to cross the Rubicon and impose full corporate criminal 
liability.”  Id.  This would tend to confirm our understanding that other instances 
of what Leigh refers to as “criminal” liability imposed on corporations before 1992 
were really administrative in nature.  France adopted a comprehensive liability 
scheme in 1992, which will be discussed further below.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 115-40. 
 85. See generally Mireille Delmas-Marty & Klaus Tiedemann, La Criminalité, 
Le Droit Pénal et Les Multinationales, 1979 Juris-Classeur Periodique, la 
Semaine Juridique, (J.C.P.) II no. 53, at I 2935 (discussing role of criminal law in 
relation to conduct of multi-national corporations). 
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blood in France,86 and unfair trade practices injuring 
consumers.87  Opponents of corporate criminal liability, 
however, in addition to their doctrinal resistance, argued 
that heavy administrative fines were sufficient to address 
corporate misconduct, and that imposing criminal liability 
would only harm a corporation’s shareholders, employees, 
and creditors.88 
B. Breaking Free from Traditional Doctrinal Restraints 
The modern trend in Western Europe of imposing 
criminal responsibility on corporations began in 1970 and 
continues to the present time.  In this section, we will 
briefly review developments in some European countries 
before focusing in more depth on developments in France 
and Germany. 
1. The Netherlands 
In 1976, the Netherlands became one of the first 
Western European countries to adopt legislation enacting 
comprehensive corporate criminal liability.  The legislation 
made corporations liable for all offenses, expanding on 
criminal liability that had previously been limited to 
economic crimes.89  The 1976 legislation also dispensed 
with the requirement that liability be predicated on the 
actions of natural persons acting on the corporation’s 
behalf, which was a requirement of the previous 1951 law.90  
Liability may be predicated on deficient decision-making 
 
 86. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at n. 52 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Bouloc, supra note 82, at 237. 
 88. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 122. 
 89. Hans de Doelder, Criminal Liability of Corporations—Netherlands, in 
Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth International Congress of Comparative 
Law, supra note 75, at 289, 291-92.  This legislation is codified in paragraph 51 of 
the Dutch Penal Code.  Id.  Doelder notes that the difference between the use of 
criminal and administrative procedures is that in the case of the former, “the 
government aims at prevention, retaliation and intentional infliction of grief; the 
adminstrative intervention aims at reparation with less moral intention.”  Id. at 
294. 
 90. Doelder, supra note 89, at 291-92. 
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structures within the corporation or on the aggregate 
knowledge of multiple individuals.91  Dutch courts appear 
to have formulated negligence-style standards in assessing 
corporate liability.92  At the same time, it appears that 
respondeat superior liability has been preserved under 
Dutch law.93  Dutch prosecutors now have the ability to 
prosecute either or both the corporation and persons 
actually responsible for the offense.94 
2. Denmark 
In 1926, with the passage of the Butter Act, Denmark 
introduced corporate criminal liability for some offenses.95  
By the end of the century, Denmark had greatly expanded 
the list of enterprise offenses.96  Recently, in 2002, the 
Danish criminal code was amended to provide that legal 
persons may be liable for all offenses within the general 
criminal code.97  However, offenses under other specialized 
laws, such as the Companies Act or the Act of Chartered 
Accountants, must specifically state whether they are 
applicable to legal entities.98 
 
 91. Coffee, supra note 70, at 21-22.  It has been said that the Netherlands has 
established “functional liability (functioneel daderschap)” in the area of socio-
economic legislation, in which courts look to whether the corporation’s 
management “had the power to decide whether those acts [the offense] took place 
or not, and the acts were parts of acts the occurrence of which according to the 
regular course of events was commonly accepted or commonly is accepted by the 
corporation.”  J.A.W. Lensing, The Netherlands, in 3 International Encyclopedia 
of Laws, Criminal Law ¶ 187 (1997 Kluwer Law International). 
 92. Coffee, supra note 70, at 22. 
 93. Id. at 21-22.  Lensing states that respondeat superior liability does not 
exist under Dutch law; however, his conclusion appears to be based on a highly 
formalistic distinction in theory.  Lensing, supra note 91, ¶ 174.  In fact, under 
the functional liability approach described by Lensing, respondeat superior 
liability may apply, at least where management was aware of and permitted the 
offense to occur. 
 94. Doelder, supra note 89, at 305.  Doelder notes that in some cases, a 
prosecutor may wish to impose liability on a natural person rather than on the 
corporate entity.  Id. 
 95. Nielsen, supra note 71, at 189, 190. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Section 306 of the Danish Criminal Code (DJØF Publishing, 2d ed. 2003). 
 98. Lars Bo Langsted et al., Denmark, 2 International Encyclopedia of Laws, 
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The Danish criminal code was previously amended in 
1996 to impose a uniform standard of criminal liability on 
various forms of legal entities.99  That provision remains in 
effect today.  The new provision also established the 
following broad standard for liability: “Criminal liability of 
a legal person is conditional upon a transgression having 
been committed within the establishment of this person by 
one or more persons connected to this legal person or by the 
legal person himself.”100  This provision appears to create 
two possibilities for liability: “either that a specific natural 
person has acted with the necessary mens rea in fulfilling 
the actus reus or that the legal person as such could and 
should have avoided the crime in question.”101  The first test 
is simple respondeat superior liability, and liability extends 
to acts “in the interests of the company” of all corporate 
officers and employees.102  Liability under the second test 
does not require identifying the exact individual who 
performed the criminal act.103  That does not mean, 
however, that corporations may be strictly liable for 
offenses (unless the legislature so provides).104  A 
corporation must be shown to have acted negligently or 
willfully, depending on the mens rea element of the specific 
offense.105 
 
Criminal Law (2003 Kluwer Law International), at ¶81; comments of Professor 
Thomas Elholm, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Southern 
Denmark, in correspondence of July 2, 2004 and July 7, 2004, with the authors 
(correspondence on file with the authors). 
 99. Nielsen, supra note 71, at 190. 
 100. Section 27(1) of the 1996 Danish Criminal Code, quoted in Langsted et al., 
supra note 98, ¶ 82. 
 101. Langsted et al., supra note 98, ¶ 82. 
 102. Nielsen, supra note 71, at 193. 
 103. Langsted et al., supra note 98, ¶ 84. 
 104. Id. ¶¶ 83-84 (noting that the necessary acts or omissions must have been 
made by a person on behalf of the corporation); Nielsen, supra note 71, at 192 
(“The law is now clear: a company can only be penalized if the violation was 
willful or negligent.”). 
 105. Nielsen, supra note 71, at 190, 192.  There is limited literature in English 
on Danish and Norwegian law.  From the comments of Gorm Toftegaard Nielsen, 
the Danish 1996 statute simply appears to be an enabling statute, directing the 
court to look at the specific offense for mens rea requirements. 
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3. Finland 
After years of debate on the subject, in 1995 Finland 
passed legislation imposing criminal liability on 
corporations.106  The new provision establishes a form of 
negligence-based liability, in which a corporation can be 
held liable (1) for the conduct of management, employees, 
or representatives, acting on behalf of the corporation, or 
(2) in the absence of an identifiable wrongdoer, if “the care 
and diligence necessary for the prevention of the offense 
has not been observed” by the corporation.107 
4. Switzerland 
In late 2003, Switzerland imposed criminal liability on 
corporations, having previously rejected such liability for 
doctrinal reasons.108  Swiss criminal liability is based on the 
concept of “subsidiary liability”: a corporation can be held 
liable for offenses committed on its behalf only if fault 
 
 106. The new provision is contained in Chapter 9 of the revised Penal Code of 
Finland (743/21 April 1995).  “The idea of introducing corporate criminal liabilty 
to the Finnish legal system was first introduced in . . . the 1970s” through several 
legislative committees studying environmental offenses, labor offenses, and 
freedom of  the press.  M. Riihijärvi, Criminal Liability of Corporations—Finland, 
in Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth International Congress of 
Comparative Law, supra note 75, at 203, 211. 
 107. 743/1995, §§ 2 and 3.  English version available online at 
http://www.wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/finnish.htm.  The new provision also 
prohibits a corporation from seeking indemnification for fines incurred from the 
actual wrongdoer, unless there is a basis in corporations or “foundations” law.  
743/1995 § 3. 
 108. Peter Muller, Petite histoire législative, in La punissabilité de l’entreprise, 
L’Expert-Comptable Suisse, edition spéciale, no. 7, June-July 2003, 11.  A limited 
exception existed for offenses involving fiscal (tax) evasion.  Id.  Opposition to 
corporate criminal liability also came from business quarters, who mounted stiff 
opposition to a proposal in the late 1980s to impose administrative criminal 
sanctions on corporations in the limited areas of organized crime and money 
laundering.  Id.  But the issue was addressed again in the 1990s.  Switzerland 
was a member of several international conventions which required member states 
to impose deterrent sanctions on corporations for various offenses in the fields of 
environmental law and government corruption.  Id.  Although such sanctions 
were not required to be penal in nature, those arguing for criminal law believed 
that Swiss administrative measures could not fulfill the symbolic and deterrent 
role of penal sanctions.  Id. at 11-12. 
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cannot be attributed to a specific individual “because of a 
lack of organization within the enterprise.”109  The offense 
must be “in furtherance of a business activity consistent 
with the purpose of the enterprise,” a requirement which 
undoubtedly will need to be defined by the courts.110  
Criminal fines can range up to 5 million Swiss francs.111 
In addition, a corporation may be held liable for certain 
serious offenses independently of the criminal liability of an 
individual, if the corporation has “failed to take all 
reasonable and necessary measures to prevent such an 
offense.”112  Those offenses are criminal organizational crime, 
money laundering, bribery, corruption, and the financing of 
terrorism.113  This provision appears to make a corporation 
presumptively liable for such offenses unless it can show 
that it has acted with reasonable diligence to prevent their 
commission.  This type of liability is predicated on 
 
 109. Art. 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code, ¶ 1, as quoted in Schellenberg 
Wittmer, Criminal Liability of Legal Entities, 20 No. 4 Int’l Enforcement L. Rep. 
133 (April 2004).  This statute appears to create a somewhat schizophrenic 
scheme of liability, in which a corporation may avoid liability for egregious and 
willful conduct by an individual acting on its behalf when a responsible actor is 
identified, but may be held criminally liable for unintended offenses because it 
negligently failed to create an organizational structure in which such an 
individual could be identified.  Moreover, as noted by Wittmer, corporations may 
be able to avoid liability simply by establishing a responsible person for “specific 
professional functions” within the corporation.  Wittmer, supra, § 3(b).  Perhaps 
in recognition of these potential escape valves for corporations, the Swiss 
legislature identified a category of offenses as serious enough to merit criminal 
liability of the corporation independent of the liability of an individual.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 112-14. 
Prior to 2003, Swiss law criminalized the “breach of duties to supervise, 
instruct and select employees.”  Christopher Ringelmann, European Trends in 
Environmental Criminal Legislation, 5 European J. Crime, Crim. L. & Just. 393, 
398 (1997).  In cases in which individual liability was difficult to prove, a 
corporation could be subject to administrative sanctions.  Id. at 400. 
 110. Art. 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code, ¶ 1, as quoted in Wittmer, 
supra note 109, § 2.  For a further discussion of how this requirement may be 
interpreted, see Robert Roth, Une responsabilité sans culpabilité, in La 
punissabilité de l’entreprise, L’Expert-Comptable Suisse, edition spéciale, no. 7, 
June-July 2003, at 17, 17-19. 
 111. Wittmer, supra note 109, § 2(e). 
 112. Art. 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code, ¶ 2, as quoted in Wittmer, 
supra note 109, § 2. 
 113. Id. § 2(b) (discussing ¶ 2 of art. 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code). 
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management’s failure to properly organize and manage the 
corporations’s affairs.114 
C. France Adopts Corporate Criminal Liability 
Since the passage of the Napoleonic Code in 1810, 
France had generally “repudiated the idea that 
corporations, as legal fictions, could be criminally liable.”115  
Thus, it was a significant development in the Western 
European movement toward imposing corporate criminal 
liability when the French legislature in 1992 enacted a 
revised penal code that included a new statutory scheme 
for imposing criminal liability on corporations.116  The 
French legislature had previously rejected a more modest 
proposal put forward by a reform commission in 1974 to 
impose criminal liability on corporations in the area of 
commercial, industrial, and financial activities.117  The 1992 
penal code provisions introducing corporate criminal 
liability were the product of years of discussion among 
legislators, legal scholars, and other interested parties, 
including representatives of the business community.118  
 
 114. One commentator has termed this “organizational failure” liability, in 
which liability is attributed to the corporation where management’s conduct did 
not directly cause the offense but its failure to properly organize the corporation 
allowed the offense to occur.  Roth, supra note 110, at 20. 
 115. Coffee, supra note 70, at 23; see also Bouloc, supra note 82, at 235. 
 116. See Bernard Bouloc, Coup d’oeil sur la responsibilité pénale des personnes 
morales, Revue Lamy Droit des affairs, no. 71 (May 2004), 5, at 5 (noting that the 
introduction of corporate criminal liability was the most significant innovation in 
the new penal code); Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 121-23 (observing that 
opposition to corporate criminal liability was finally overcome). 
 117. Bouloc, supra note 82, at 237.  While the debate regarding the imposition 
of criminal liability on corporations in the economic field was occurring, the 
French government was increasingly imposing civil and administrative 
restrictions on corporations in the economic sphere.  In 1972, 1973, and 1974, the 
French legislature, through a series of laws, “began to intervene” to protect 
consumers from “abuses” of market position committed by distributers.  See id. at 
237-38.  In 1977, France’s Economy Minister was given the power to impose 
sanctions on corporations for violations of consumer protection and market 
competition laws.  See id. at 237.  And as noted supra note 84, by the early 1980s, 
the French government had imposed quasi-criminal liability on corporations in a 
few areas. 
 118. See infra note 261. 
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The introduction of comprehensive criminal responsibility 
on corporations brought forth “reservations and criticism” 
from the corporate classes.119 
1. The Statutory Basis for Criminal Responsibility of 
Legal Entities, Including Corporations 
The basis for corporate criminal liability in French law 
is codified in article 121-2 of the new French penal code, 
which states: “Juridicial persons, with the exception of the 
State, are criminally liable for the offenses committed on 
their account by their organs or representatives . . . in the 
cases provided for by statute or regulations.”120  Article 121-2 
further provides the “criminal liability of legal persons does 
not exclude that of the natural persons who are perpetrators 
or accomplices to the same act.”121  This clause appears to 
respond directly to the critique—raised during the early 
legislative process that led to the adoption of the 1992 penal 
code—that corporate liability could be used to shield 
corporate officers and directors from criminal liability.122 
2. The Prerequisites for the Imposition of Criminal 
Liability on Legal Entities 
There are three basic requirements for liability to be 
imposed under article 121-2.  First, the French legislature 
must have enacted a substantive criminal offense which 
 
 119. Bouloc, supra note 82, at 237-38.  In response to the enactment of 
corporate criminal liability, the National Association of French Employers issued 
a study addressing the new legal implications of such liability for corporations.  
See Pierrick B. Le Goff, The French Approach to Corporate Liability for Damage 
to the Environment, 12 Tul. Euro. & Civ. L.F. 39, 39 n.117 (1997). 
 120. Art. 121-2, reprinted in Recueil Dalloz, Code Penal (Dalloz 2004).  Article 
121-2 is available in English at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Gerard Couturier, Répartition des responsabilités entre personnes 
morales et peronnes physiques, 111 Revue des Societes (Dalloz, April-June 1993), 
at 307.  See Bouloc, supra note 116, at 5, 8 (noting that the Court of Cassation has 
stated that personal liability may exist coterminously with corporate liability, 
without the need to establish a distinct fault on the part of either the individual 
or the corporation not committed by the other). 
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the corporation contravened.123  Second, actual criminal 
responsibility for the offense must lie in the conduct of a 
corporation’s representatives or its organs.124  Third, the 
acts on which criminal liability is predicated must have 
been committed for the benefit of the corporation.125  The 
Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation is still 
clarifying the second and third of these requirements—that 
the criminal act be done by certain representatives or units 
(“organs”) of the corporation and that the act be done for 
the corporation’s benefit.126  The scope of corporate liability 
inevitably turns on how the Court of Cassation chooses to 
define a “representative” and an “organ.” 
a. A Corporation’s “Representative” 
The term “representative” means a high ranking 
officer or an agent or employee with delegated authority 
from a corporate officer.  Therefore, criminal offenses 
committed by such persons on behalf of the corporation will 
give rise to criminal liability.127  The legislature, when 
enacting article 121-2, did not originally envisage that a 
corporation could be held criminally liable based on the 
conduct of lower level employees.128 
 
 123. Le Goff, supra note 119, at 60; Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, app. B, 
at 141. 
 124. As one commentator has stated, the natural person is the obligatory 
means toward imposing criminal liability on a corporation.  Jacques Leroy, Droit 
Penal General, ¶ 444, at 287 (Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 
2003) (“La personne physique est, ainsi, le passage obligé de la mise en oeuvre de 
la responsibilité pénale des personnes morales.”). 
 125. Art. 121-2 (“offenses committed on their account”).  However, actions 
taken primarily for the benefit of the actor, as opposed to the corporation, cannot 
be the basis for corporate liability.  Bouloc, supra note 82, at 240.  Obviously, this 
test is one that is forever subject to difficulty at the margins, when the intent of 
the individual actor and the interests of the corporation merge.  See Bouloc, supra 
note 116, at 5, 7. 
 126. See Bouloc, supra note 82, at 240 (discussing ambiguity of the term 
“representative”).  Professor Coffee has noted that the degree of managerial 
involvement, the role of collective entity knowledge, and the absence of negligence 
remain undefined factors under article 121-2.  Coffee, supra note 70, at 24. 
 127. Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 447, at 288-89. 
 128. Mireille Delmas-Marty, supra note 72, at 304; Bouloc, supra note 82, at 
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However, it is unclear whether the legislature 
intended for the corporation to be liable for offenses 
requiring a showing of intentional fault where it can be 
shown that a corporation’s representative had the 
necessary state of mind for the offense (through intent, 
knowledge, or willful blindness), but the criminal act was 
committed by another person without immediately 
delegated authority.  Much to the dismay of some scholars, 
the Court of Cassation initially rejected such an approach, 
instead requiring that full criminal responsibility lie with a 
corporate representative in order for criminal responsibility 
to be imputed to the corporation.129  Since then, however, 
 
240. 
 129. See Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 447 (citing Cass. crim., 11 May 1999, Droit 
pénal, comm. no. 140 (deuxième espèce), note M. Vérnon; Cass. Crim. 26 June 
2001, Bull. crim., no. 161).  Delmas-Marty, in an article published after the 
passage of article 121-2 but before its implementation, argued that it was possible 
to interpret the new law as separating the “moral element” of an offense from the 
“material element,” and imposing liability on the corporation for the conduct of 
lower level employees when the “moral element” (i.e., fault or state of mind) of the 
offense lay with a corporation’s representative or its board of directors.  Delmas-
Marty, supra note 72, at 304.  Another commentator noted that a lower court in 
Lyon originally took such an approach, but the Court of Cassation quickly noted 
its disagreement and required the establishment of personal liability as a 
predicate for corporate liability.  Jean-Claud Planque, Note, Influence de loi du 10 
juillet 2000 sur la responsabilité pénale des personnes morales, Commentaires 
Dalloz, no. 6, at 514, 515-16 (citing Cass. Crim., 2 Dec. 1997, Bull. crim., no. 408; 
Cass. Crim. 7 July 1998, Bull. crim., no. 216).  This commentator has also called 
for the legislature to clarify article 121-2 so that corporate criminal responsibility 
is autonomous of personal responsibility.  Id. at 518.  See also Leroy, supra note 
124, ¶ 447, at 288-89 (suggesting that corporate fault should not simply “ricochet” 
off of personal liability, and proposing the imposition of criminal liability on a 
corporation in cases where it is poorly structured so as to permit the commission 
of an offense).  See also Circular of May 14, 1993, Commentaries on Legislative 
Provision of the Nouveau Code Pénal and on Provisions of Law of December 16, 
1992, as translated in part in Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 139-62 (noting 
that “a personne morale might be found criminally responsible in the absence of 
deliberate willfulness of its corporate bodies or officers, and this is contrary to the 
1978 proposal submitted by the Revision Committee.  Personnnes morale might, 
indeed, be prosecuted for offenses of negligence or imprudence . . . .”).  But see 
Circular of May 14, 1993, as translated in Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 
148 (“[I]t can be said that a personne morale can be held criminally responsible as 
a main perpetrator, when its corporate bodies or officers have . . . carried out, as a 
main perpetrator, the moral and material elements of the offense.”).  The Circular 
was drafted “under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice in consultation with a 
task group composed of judges, law professors, lawyers and police 
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the Court of Cassation has relaxed this rigid requirement 
in certain cases.130 
A July 2000 amendment to article 121-3 of the new 
penal code effectively expanded the scope of liability for 
criminal negligence under article 121-2.  The July 2000 
amendment made natural persons indirectly liable for 
negligence-based offenses because of their failure to take 
measures to prevent the offense (by deliberately ignoring a 
duty of care or other statutory obligation imposed on 
them).131  Criminal negligence may now be imputed to a 
corporation because of the negligence of one of its officers, 
even when that person was not personally involved in the 
offense.  The Court of Cassation, however, still appears to 
require that actual negligence on the part of a corporate 
representative is established.132 
 
representatives.” Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 137.  A Circular, which is 
not a legislative document, may not be cited by a French court as the legal basis 
for a decision.  Id. at 138. 
 130. Planque, supra note 129, at 516 (citing J.-H. Robert, Chron. dr. pénal, JCP 
2000, I, no. 289). 
 131. Prior to its amendment, article 121-3 provided: 
A misdemeanour also exists, where the law so provides, in cases of 
recklessness, negligence, or failure to observe an obligation of due care or 
precaution imposed by any statute or regulation, where it is established 
that the offender has failed to show normal diligence, taking into 
consideration where appropriate the nature of his role or functions, of his 
capacities and powers and of the means then available to him. 
The July 2000 amendment added the following paragraph: 
In the case as referred to in the above paragraph, natural persons who 
have not directly contributed to causing the damage, but who have created 
or contributed to create the situation which allowed the damage to happen 
who failed to take steps enabling it to be avoided, are criminally liable 
where it is shown that they have broken a duty of care or precaution laid 
down by statute or regulation in a manifestly deliberate manner, or have 
committed a specified piece of misconduct which exposed another person to 
a particularly serious risk of which they must have been aware. 
Art. 121-3, as enacted through Act no. 1996-393 of 13 May 1996 art. 1 Official 
Journal of 14 May 1996; and amended by Act no. 2000-647 of 10 July art. 1 
Official Journal of 11 July 2000.  English translation available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr. 
 132. An October 2000 decision of the Court of Cassation, interpreting article 
121-3 and article 121-2, as well as worker safety laws, held that a corporation 
could be criminally liable for the injury to a worker caused by the conduct of the 
director of a factory if it could be shown that the corporate representative was 
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b. A Corporation’s “Organ” 
The conduct of “organs” of a corporation may also be 
imputed to the corporation to establish criminal 
responsibility.  An “organ” is an organization within the 
corporation that is formally identified in the French 
corporations law, such as its board of directors or its 
shareholders (e.g., acting through a shareholder meeting).133  
The extent of liability that may be imposed on a corporation 
because of the actions of one of its organs appears to turn on 
the question of whether decision makers within the organ 
must themselves be identified in the commission of the crime, 
or whether it is enough to identify the collective actions of the 
persons within that unit as responsible.  Once again, the 
Court of Cassation took a narrow reading of the code, and was 
reluctant to permit liability without identifying culpable 
individuals within the corporate organ.134  Under this narrow 
approach, even where a board of directors is collectively 
responsible for the commission of an offense, liability will not 
be imputed to the corporation unless one of the board’s 
members is found to be personally responsible for the 
commission of the offense.135  This interpretation is so 
constrained that it renders the concept of “organ” nearly 
coextensive with the concept of “representative.” 
 
personally negligent under article 121-3.  See Jean-Claude Planque, supra note 
129, at 515-16 (citing Cass. crim., 24 Oct. 2000, Bull. crim., no. 308).  Planque has 
suggested that the amendment to article 121-3 creates tension with the basic 
theory of liability under article 121-2, as originally articulated by the Court of 
Cassation, which requires criminal responsibility to lie entirely with a natural 
person who acts on behalf of the corporation.  See generally id. 
 133. Leroy, supra note 124, ¶¶ 446-447, at 288-89. The term is highly 
problematic, in that it appears to include persons who can be representatives but 
may not include certain board, managerial, and shareholder bodies in more 
modern French corporate law.  Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 447, at 288-89. 
 134. Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 446, at 288 (citing Cass. crim., 11 May 1999, 
Droit pénal, comm. no. 140 (deuxième espèce), note M. Vérnon). 
 135. See Leroy, supra note 124, ¶ 446, at 288.  However, one 1998 decision of 
the Court of Cassation suggested that it may be possible to impose liability even 
in the absence of a clearly identified wrongdoer within the corporation if the 
nature of the offense and the circumstances of its commission make its 
imputation to the corporation reasonably certain.  Id. at 288 (citing Cass. crim., 1 
Dec. 1998, Bull. Crim., no. 325). 
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3. Substantive Corporate Offenses under French Law 
Although the formal elements of criminal liability 
under article 121-2 remain uncertain, the French 
legislature has continued to expand the list of substantive 
offenses for which a corporation may be liable.  When first 
proposed through a legislative reform commission in 1974, 
criminal liability was originally to be imposed in the areas 
of commercial, industrial, and financial activities, and 
quasi-criminal liability was imposed in these areas before 
1992.136  The newly enacted article 121-2, however, by 
operation of other parts of the French code, reaches many 
more substantive areas, including antitrust offenses and 
environmental crimes.137  By 2001, liability was expanded 
to include commercial torts, unsafe working conditions, and 
even new areas such as homicide, rape, and human rights 
abuses caused by corporate actors.138 
4. Statutory Sanctions for Corporate Offenders 
Another important feature of the new French law is 
that it provides an expansive list of statutory criminal 
penalties.  In most cases, these will be monetary penalties 
five times the rate for natural persons committing the same 
 
 136. See supra notes 84 and 117 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Le Goff, supra note 119, at 60-63 (discussing interplay of article 121-2 
with environmental laws); id. at 60 (noting application of article 121-2 to 
antitrust and worker safety laws); Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at 141-46 
(generally listing substantive corporate criminal offenses). 
 138. Olivier Sautel, La Mise en oeuvre de la responsabilité pénale des 
personnes morale: entre litanie et liturgie, Le Dalloz 2002, no. 14, at 1147; see 
also Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé (4), Dalloz Oct.-Dec. 
2001, at 843 (reviewing new legislative enactments of substantive offenses); 
Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, at app. B, 141-46 (listing offenses).  This 
expansion of substantive liability has caused one commentator to argue that 
French corporate criminal liability has become “totally incoherent” and to 
recommend that the legislature adopt a general system of criminal liability that 
makes criminal corporate liability more “rationale” and “predictable.”  Sautel, 
supra, at 1147-48.  Playing on the French term for “juridicial person” (“personne 
morale”), Sautel has suggested that the expansion of substantive corporate 
liability has “left no doubt” that “personnes morales have become personnes 
immorales capable of killing, injuring, and raping.”  Id. at 1148. 
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offense, with greater monetary penalties for recidivist 
conduct.139  The penal code also includes some other 
penalties available to a court in extraordinary 
circumstances.  These include judicial supervision of a 
corporation’s affairs for a period of five years (e.g., the 
ability to enter a contract), a five-year ban on the issuance 
of publicly financed corporate bonds, limitations on the use 
of checks and credit to make payments, confiscation of 
assets which facilitated or were gained from the offense, 
posting of notices throughout the media, publication of the 
judgment in a registry, and, in extreme cases, dissolution of 
the corporation.140 
D. Movement Toward Corporate Criminal Liability in 
Germany 
Unlike France, Germany has not overcome its 
longstanding opposition to the imposition of criminal 
liability on artificial entities.  Interestingly, resistance to 
the imposition of corporate liability appears to come from 
scholars and jurists more concerned with the “purity” of the 
notion of blame and fault in the criminal law than with the 
effects on corporations of imposing criminal-style sanctions 
on them.141  Today, corporate misconduct still is addressed 
through administrative sanctions imposed by 
 
 139. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, app. A at 129, 132, 135 (citing articles 
131-38, 131-41 and 132-12 through 132-15 of the French penal code); Bouloc, 
supra note 82, at 246-47. 
 140. Orland & Cachera, supra note 73, app. A at 130 (citing article 131-39 of 
the French penal code); Bouloc, supra note 82, at 247; Le Goff, supra note 119, at 
60-61 (noting the establishment of “a specific register containing the criminal 
record of legal entities” and other offenses designed to compensate for the fact 
that corporations “cannot be imprisoned”).  Cf. Michael Faure & Günter Heine, 
Environmental Criminal Law in the European Union (Max Planck Institute 
2000), at 127 (noting that more severe sanctions against corporations are 
“substitutes for imprisonment” and therefore should not be available unless a 
prison sentence could be imposed on a person guilty of the same offense). 
 141. Mark Pieth, International Developments, in Criminal Responsibility of 
Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 113, 116 (“[T]he fear [of German 
scholars] is that essential safeguards of both substantive and procedural law 
would be put at risk” from derogations of the “principle of personal guilt or 
blameworthiness.”). 
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administrative bodies and supervised by criminal courts.  
Corporations can face fines of millions of euros and other 
sanctions that are quasi-criminal in status,142 such as 
confiscation of illicit gains or property used to facilitate 
offenses.143  Because of German law’s emphasis on 
classifications, severe sanctions may be imposed on 
corporations in administrative proceedings as long as they 
are classified formally as “monetary fines” imposed for 
“order violations,” rather than “punishments” for 
“crimes.”144 
Although corporate officers and directors are subject to 
criminal liability for their own acts145 and the acts of 
corporate subordinates,146 some German prosecutors and 
academics have noted that corporations have learned to 
structure transactions so as to avoid the imposition of 
liability on directors and officers.147  Others have noted that 
 
 142. Roland Hefendehl, Corporate Criminal Liability: Model Penal Code 
Section 2.07 and the Development in Western Legal Systems, 4 Buff. Crim. L. 
Rev. 283, 286 (2000); Heine, supra note 72, at 174-75. 
 143. H.J. Hirsch, La Criminalisation du Comportement Collectif–Allemagne, in 
Criminal Liability of Corporations, XIVth International Congress of Comparative 
Law, supra note 75, at 31, 62-64.  Sanctions are increasingly common in the areas 
of commercial and environmental law.  Id. at 32.  Some administrative violations 
may even carry sanctions such as restrictions on activities, revocations of licenses 
and concessions.  Id. at 48.  In limited cases, when a corporation’s conduct 
transgresses fundamental criminal law or other law and poses a danger to 
society, it may be subject to dissolution.  Id. at 47. 
 144. See Dubber, supra note 73, at 17 & n.71. 
 145. German prosecutors attempted to pursue sanctions against four directors 
of the former Mannesmann Corporation for approving a pay-out package of $66 
million for senior management in the Vodaphone takeover of Mannesmann.  
Mark Landler, Deutsche Bank Executive to Have His Day in Court, N.Y. Times, 
October 18, 2003, at C3.  However, a German court acquitted the directors on 
July 22, 2004.  Mark Landler, Corporate Pay Case Ends in Acquittal, N.Y. Times, 
July 23, 2003, at W1. 
 146. Heine, supra note 72, at 177.  Cf. Jurgen Meyer, Comments on 
Developments in Germany, in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective 
Entities, supra note 70, at 129, 129 (noting that criminal law provides for 
individual liability for corporate offenses in the areas of fraudulent tender offers, 
capital investment fraud, tax evasion, breach of export laws, manufacture and 
distribution of products harmful to health, industrial environmental pollution and 
dumping, and money laundering). 
 147. Klaus-Dieter Benner, A Description of the Legal Practices in Germany, in 
Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 53, 54-
55.  Because of this liability scheme, German criminal law may fail to reach 
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the increasing size of large corporations makes it difficult 
to identify the individual culpable of the offense.148  
Moreover, German law “limits the class of natural persons 
whose acts may make the corporation liable” under 
administrative or civil law to its legal representatives and 
directors,149 so identification of the person who committed 
the offense is unlikely to result in liability of the 
corporation.  Criminal liability that may ultimately fall on 
a lower-level employee for his own criminal conduct does 
little to deter corporate misconduct.  When an employee is 
convicted of an offense and is fined, the corporation may 
reimburse the fines, further diluting the effect of the 
criminal law.150 
It is not surprising, then, that some German 
prosecutors and scholars believe that individual criminal 
liability does not obviate the need for the imposition of 
criminal liability on corporations.151  German scholars have 
 
corporations engaged in crimes ranging from financial fraud schemes to the 
dumping of toxic wastes.  Id.; Harald Kolz, Aspects of Legal Practice in Germany, 
in Criminal Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 67, 
67-68.  German academics have traditionally played an important role in the 
development of the criminal law.  See Dubber, supra note 73, at 7-8. 
 148. Hirsch, supra note 143, at 33.  One commentator noted that, “[e]ven in 
cases where the prosecuting authorities have established without a doubt that a 
criminal offense has been committed by and in the interest of a company, illegal 
dumping of waste or water pollution for example, complex organisational 
structures and company hierarchies mean that it is often not possible to ascertain 
with sufficient certainty who the individual offender is and to call them to 
account.  To an increasing degree, we are seeing an ‘organised’ or structural lack 
of individual responsibility.”  Meyer, supra note 146, at 130.  This commentator 
further notes that an increasing number of criminal prosecutions for 
environmental offenses are being dismissed by the prosecutor’s office.  Id. 
 149. Coffee, supra note 70, at 23. 
 150. Gerd Eidam, Aspects of Legal Practice in Germany, in Criminal 
Responsibility of Legal and Collective Entities, supra note 70, at 59, 64-65; Hirsh, 
supra note 143, at 33 & n.9 (noting that the corporation’s partial reimbursement 
of fines incurred by an employee by a corporation “does not constitute a 
connivance at evasion” under German law). 
 151. See, e.g., Benner, supra note 147, at 56-58 (noting German companies find 
it cheaper to pay fines incurred than to comply with the law); Hefendehl, supra 
note 142, at 283-84 (noting that European scholars may be over-emphasizing 
doctrinal opposition to corporate liability and that corporate misconduct is 
increasingly the subject of concern among scholars); Meyer, supra note 146, at 
132 (proposing corporate criminal sanctions similar to those proposed by the EU’s 
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proposed different theoretical models for the imposition of 
criminal liability.  Some have suggested an alternative to 
the Anglo-American respondeat superior theory of liability, 
and have examined an “organizational fault” model.152  
Under this model, liability is premised on the identification 
of a deficiency in the organizational structure that caused 
the offense.153  While this would address the problem raised 
by the conscious attempt of a corporate hierarchy to turn a 
blind eye toward misconduct at lower levels in the 
organization, the doctrine is broader, and reaches negligent 
failure by management in supervising the corporation.  The 
corporation would be liable for the commission of an offense 
if its structure is deemed inadequate to respond to the risks 
created by its operational conduct.154  Proponents favoring 
this model of liability argue that corporate misconduct is 
not always the result of a deliberate managerial choice to 
ignore the law but the result of several acts by lower level 
employees and organizations within the corporation, “the 
sum of . . . which constitute the offense.”155  They also 
suggest that the greater social injury caused by corporate 
misconduct requires a conceptual approach to corporate 
crime that is not constrained by the identification of a 
responsible person, as is required by more traditional 
theories of liability.156 
At some point, one other feature of German criminal 
law may also come into play in the debate over whether to 
create corporate criminal liability.  The theory of positive 
general prevention, which has become the dominant theory 
of punishment in Germany, defines the function of criminal 
 
1988 proposal and available in French law, including publication of judgment, 
prohibition on advertising, and dissolution). 
 152. Heine, supra note 72, at 182-83; Hefendehl, supra note 142, at 297-98 
(discussing Bernd Schünemann’s proposal to abandon the principle of personal 
guilt for corporate criminal liability). 
 153. Heine, supra note 72, at 182-83. 
 154. Heine, supra note 72, at 182-83; Hefendehl, supra note 142, at 297-98. 
 155. Eidam, supra note 150, at 65. 
 156. Hefendehl, supra note 142, at 293 (noting Schünemann’s view that the 
“collective act patterns” of corporations are inconsistent with individual guilt, and 
that the “danger to legal rights protected by the criminal law increases in the 
field of” corporate conduct). 
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punishment as “bolstering the lawabidingness” of the 
population.157  Although this theory has traditionally been 
focused on individuals, it might also be extended to 
corporate persons, as a means of enhancing their “‘general 
legal consciousness.’”158  This theory seems to bear some 
resemblance to the arguments of American theorists that 
criminal law serves an expressive or social meaning 
function.159 
E. European Transnational Proposals for Corporate 
Criminal Liability 
In recent years, transnational European organizations 
have begun to recommend that member states impose 
criminal or quasi-criminal liability on corporations for 
specific types of offenses through the member states’ own 
legal regimes.  Some of the developments from two key 
organizations, the Council of Europe and the European 
Union (“EU”) will be discussed here, because they provide 
insight into a strain of influential European thought, and 
may anticipate the direction of corporate criminal liability 
in the European member states (whose representatives 
comprise the governing bodies of these organizations).160  It 
 
 157. See Dubber, supra note 73, at 20. 
 158. See id. at 21. 
 159. These arguments are developed supra at text accompanying notes 61-63.  
Note, however, that positive general prevention developed independently of, and 
partially in response to, Karl Binding’s norm theory.  See Dubber, supra note 73, 
at 18-19. 
 160. We will discuss some of the recommendations of the Council of Europe and 
the European Union.  The Council of Europe is a loose association of European 
states across the continent.  From time to time, the Council will produce 
conventions that attempt to standardize member states’s social and legal 
practices. See http://www.coe.int (“about the Council of Europe”). These 
conventions are legally binding on member states that ratify them, although 
many ratify them with reservations.  See id. (“about conventions”). 
The European Union (“EU”) is a smaller group of European nations that 
form a common economic market to standardize economic policies, national fiscal 
policies, and trade policies.  Increasingly, the EU is attempting to standardize 
policies in the areas of the environment and in legal spheres affecting economic 
relations, such as intellectual property and corporate governance.  The EU is also 
attempting to address criminal activity of concern to all member states, such as 
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should be noted, however, that the proposals for corporate 
liability discussed in this section have yet to be fully 
implemented by member states. 
1. Proposals of the Council of Europe 
a. Proposal for Standardization of Enterprise 
Criminal Liability 
In 1988, the Council of Europe passed a 
recommendation that member states study the need to 
standardize criminal “enterprise” liability among the 
member states.161  The Council noted that its proposal was 
in response to several factors: the “considerable damage” 
caused by “criminal offences committed in the exercise of 
the activities of enterprises,” the difficulty in identifying 
responsible individuals within the corporation due to the 
complexity of the corporate structure, and the desirability 
of placing criminal responsibility on the corporation 
benefitting from illegal activity.162 
The Council’s recommendation was significant in three 
respects.  First, the Council “favor[ed] a negligence-based 
approach to corporate criminal liability.”163  The Council 
recommended imposing liability for offenses committed in 
the course of corporate activities, unless it could be shown 
that “management [was] not implicated in the offence and 
[had] taken all the necessary steps to prevent its 
 
financial crimes, foreign exchange crimes, and political corruption of EU bodies.  
Policies and laws, in the form of directives and regulations, are proposed by the 
EU’s executive body (the Commission), and adopted by its legislative bodies (the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union).  The Parliament 
and Council can modify and reject proposals of the Commission.  Laws and 
regulations in various legal, social, and economic spheres require member states 
to harmonize or modify their laws consistent with the relevant directive or 
regulation.  See http://www.europa.eu.int/institutions. 
 161. See Liability of Enterprises for Offenses, Recommendation No. R (88) 18, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 20 October of 
1988, available at http://www.coe.int. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Coffee, supra note 70, at 35. 
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commission.”164  Second, as would later appear in article 
121-2 of the new French penal code, the Council explicitly 
noted that corporate criminal liability should not displace 
the liability of natural persons, particularly managers.165  
Third, the Council’s recommendation proposed sanctions on 
corporations that included alternatives to monetary fines, 
such as the removal of managers, the appointment of 
“provisional caretaker management” by a court, 
disgorgement of illegal gains and property used to facilitate 
offenses, prohibition on public contracts, denial of public 
fiscal benefits, prohibition on advertising goods or services, 
publication of the judgment, and closure or winding-up of 
the corporation.166  The Council’s 1988 recommendation has 
not been adopted by the member states, possibly because 
doing so would have required them to address the doctrinal 
resistance in their legal systems to the imposition of 
corporate criminal liability.  As we have noted, such 
doctrinal resistance continues in states such as Germany 
and Italy.167 
b. Proposal for Corporate Liability for 
Environmental Offenses 
Subsequent proposals for corporate liability targeted 
specific fields of social and economic activity.  In 1998, the 
Council of Europe approved for signature by member states 
the Convention on the Protection of the Environment 
through Criminal Law.  Articles 2 and 3 of the convention 
identify a series of intentional and negligent offenses 
involving unlawful discharges into the air, soil, and water, 
and unlawful manufacture, transportation, and storage of 
hazardous materials, among other offenses.168  Article 9 of 
 
 164. Liability of Enterprises for Offenses, Recommendation No. R (88) 18, 
supra note 161, ¶¶ 1-5. 
 165. Id. ¶ 5. 
 166. Id. ¶ 7.  See also Möhrenschlager, supra note 74, at 95-96. 
 167. See supra notes 75 and 141, and accompanying text. 
 168. European Treaty Series No. 172, Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment through Criminal Law, 4 Nov. 1998, arts. 2 and 3, available at 
http://www.coe.int. 
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the convention recommends that member states impose 
criminal liability on corporations, but it also gives them the 
option of imposing administrative sanctions.169  Individual 
criminal liability is not displaced.170  The preamble to the 
convention notes that “imposing criminal or administrative 
sanctions on legal persons can play an effective role in the 
prevention of environmental violations.”171  One 
commentator has noted that the convention’s proposal for 
corporate criminal liability appears influenced by the new 
French law, in that it makes an entity criminally liable for 
acts committed by its representatives or its “organs.”172  
France, Germany, and eleven other member states have 
signed the convention, but only Estonia has ratified it.173 
c. Proposal for Corporate Liability for Offenses 
Involving Corruption 
In 1999, the Council of Europe put forward for 
signature a Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.  The 
Convention identifies a series of offenses related to bribery 
of domestic and foreign public officials, including officials in 
international organizations.174  Article 18 states that 
signatory parties are to adopt measures “necessary to 
ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the criminal 
offences of active bribery, trading in influence and money 
laundering.”175  Like the convention on the environment, 
the convention on corruption predicates corporate liability 
on the acts of a representative or organ of the 
corporation.176  But the convention on corruption expands 
the scope of corporate liability to cases in which the “lack of 
supervision or control” by corporate management makes 
 
 169. Id. art. 9; Ringelmann, supra note 109, at 400. 
 170. European Treaty Series No. 172, supra note 168, art. 9.2. 
 171. European Treaty Series No. 172, supra note 168, at preamble. 
 172. Möhrenschlager, supra note 74, at 103. 
 173. http://conventions.coe.int (convention on environmental law). 
 174. European Treaty Series No. 173, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, 
27 Jan. 1999, arts. 2-12. 
 175. Id. art. 18. 
 176. Id. art. 18. 
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the offense possible.177  Individual criminal liability is not 
displaced.178  Although the title of the Convention refers to 
criminal law, it permits countries to use quasi-criminal or 
administrative sanctions, rather than criminal sanctions.  
Parties are required to adopt “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions” against 
corporate offenders who commit any of the identified 
offenses.179  The Convention has been ratified and entered 
into force by thirty countries.  Significantly, however, 
France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland have not ratified 
it, and Spain has not even signed it.180 
2. Proposals of the European Union 
a. Administrative Liability for Anti-competition 
Offenses 
One of the first European transnational agreements to 
impose liability on corporations was the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome, which established a common market for goods and 
services by the 1960s that was known as the European 
Economic Community (comprised originally of Belgium, 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands).  The EEC is the precursor to today’s 
European Union.  Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, 
as amended, prohibit anti-competitive conduct within the 
common market.181  Specifically, article 81 prohibits 
restrictive agreements and concerted activities, and article 
82 prohibits abuses of dominant market positions.182  The 
 
 177. Id. art. 18.2.  This standard is similar to the standard in the Council’s 
1988 proposal, which recommends an examination of whether management acted 
negligently.  See supra text accompanying note 164. 
 178. Id. art. 18.3. 
 179. Id. art. 19. 
 180. http://conventions.coe.int (convention on corruption). 
 181. As originally enacted, articles 81 and 82 were numbered articles 85 and 
86.  They were renumbered by the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on 
European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities, and 
Certain Related Acts, signed on 2 October 1997, and available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties. 
 182. James S. Venit, EU Competition Law—Enforcement and Compliance: An 
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EU’s executive body, the Commission, is empowered to 
investigate companies engaging in anti-competitive 
conduct, to enjoin conduct, and to impose heavy 
sanctions.183  Sanctions have become increasingly higher, 
with one sanction reportedly exceeding US $300 million on 
a company found to have engaged in an illegal market-
sharing cartel.184 
Although the sanctions imposed by the Commission 
are civil fines, some commentators have suggested that the 
sanctions are so severe as to be criminal in nature.185  
Regardless of how one characterizes them, it is fair to 
suggest that the role and nature of these sanctions appear 
to have influenced member states’s attitudes regarding the 
imposition of penal liability on corporations under their 
own legal regimes.  Even in countries that continue to 
resist the imposition of corporate criminal liability, such as 
Italy and Germany, quasi-criminal administrative 
sanctions that follow the EU model have been introduced.186 
b. Council Framework Decision Regarding 
Environmental Offenses 
The Council of the European Union has adopted a 
“Framework Decision” requiring member states to impose 
 
Overview, 65 Antitrust L.J. (Fall 1996), at 81, 82-84. 
 183. Id. at 84-85. 
 184. Id. at 86. 
 185. See Möhrenschlager, supra 74, at 98 (noting that some scholars have 
argued that the fines, although deemed civil, resemble criminal sanctions and 
therefore are outside the scope of the Commission’s authority). 
 186. Italy, for example, has replicated EU anti-competition sanctions through 
passage of a 1990 law, with an administrative authority empowered to impose 
fines on corporations.  One Italian scholar, commenting on the Italian anti-
competition fines, noted that “we cannot escape the structural analogy between 
these fines and those which are envisaged for corporations in the penal systems of 
common law.  On the one hand, this indicates that types of direct responsibility 
for collective bodies exist also in countries which are still tied to a traditional 
negation of the criminal capacity of corporations.  On the other hand, this analogy 
expresses the uncertainty of labeling the nature of sanctions, thereby confirming 
the necessity of reconsidering the bases of criminal responsibility for collective 
subjects.”  Militello, supra note 75, at 183. 
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liability on legal entities for environmental offenses.187  The 
Framework explicitly cites the Council of Europe’s 1998 
convention on the environment and borrows from it in 
several respects.  First, it identifies a series of intentional 
and negligent offenses regarding unlawful discharges and 
production, storage, transportation, etc., of hazardous 
materials.188  Second, it recommends that member states 
adopt measures to impose criminal liability on legal 
persons based on acts of their representatives and 
organs.189  The Council’s Framework also recommends 
liability in cases where there is a lack of supervision or 
control in the corporation that “made possible the 
commission” of the offense.190  Although the Framework 
decision encourages the imposition of criminal liability, it 
does not appear to be mandatory, since member states have 
the option of imposing criminal or civil fines and other 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions,” such as 
disqualification from certain industrial or commercial 
activities, or even judicial supervision and winding-up of 
the corporation.191  Third, the Framework Decision states 
that corporate liability should not “exclude criminal 
proceedings against natural persons who are perpetrators, 
instigators or accessories” in the identified offenses.192 
The Council adopted its Framework Decision in lieu of 
a directive proposed for its adoption by the Commission.  
The Commission’s proposed directive appears to leave 
member states with less discretion in imposing criminal 
liability on legal persons, which may have been one reason 
 
 187. Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA of 27 Jan. 2003 on the 
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, in Official J. Eur. Union, 
at L 29/55. 
 188. Compare id. arts. 2 and 3 with ETS 172, supra note 168, arts. 2 and 3. 
 189. Compare Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 187, art. 6, with 
ETS 172, supra note 168, art. 9. 
 190. Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 187, art. 6.2.  Similarly, the 
Council of Europe’s convention directs member states to impose negligent-based 
liability on corporations for environmental offenses.  ETS 172, supra note 168, 
arts. 3 and 9. 
 191. Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 187, art. 7. 
 192. Compare Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, supra note 187, art. 6, with 
ETS 172, supra note 168, art. 9.2. 
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the Council ultimately declined to adopt it.193  In response, 
the Commission took the unusual step of asking the 
European Court of Justice to annul the Framework 
Decision on the basis that the Council did not rest its 
action on the appropriate legal grounds found in EU treaty 
law.194  It is unclear why the Council adopted a Framework 
Decision after rejecting the proposed directive.  It is 
possible, however, that the public’s outrage at the oil spill 
in November 2002 caused by the Prestige tanker off the 
coasts of Spain and France195 pressured the Council to 
adopt some type of measure with respect to corporate 
environmental offenses. 
c. Proposal for a Directive Involving Corruption 
Offenses 
In 2001, the Commission of the European Union 
recommended that member states adopt corporate criminal 
liability to combat fraud and “corruption” (i.e., bribery) 
directed at the use of European Union funds and money 
 
 193. See generally Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law of March 
13, 2001, COM (2001) 139, as amended on September 30, 2002, COM (2002) 544.  
The preamble to the proposed directive states: “Although Community law may, in 
certain cases, already require Member States to provide for criminal penalties 
with regard to article 10 EC, currently there is no Community provision which 
requires expressly this type of sanction.  As a consequence, there is not only a 
lack of certainty of the law with regard to the Member States’s obligations to 
provide for criminal penalties, but there is no minimum standard or acquis 
communautaire with regard to offences to the detriment of the environment.” 
 194. The Legislative Observatory of the EU, at http://www.europarl.eu.int 
(Identification reference no. COD/2001/0076).  According to the Commission, the 
appropriate legal basis for establishing criminal penalties for environmental law 
community-wide is article 175 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, referred to as the “first pillar” of Community law.  The Framework 
Decision, however, rests on title VI of the Treaty on European Union relating to 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, referred to as the “third pillar.”  The 
Commission expressed doubt that the “third pillar” provides an appropriate “legal 
basis for requiring Member States to provide for criminal penalties for 
environmental offences.”  Id. (entry of March 3, 2003). 
 195. France Targets Tanker Spill Culprits, BBC News Europe, January 2, 
2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2622855.stm. 
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laundering.196  The Commission noted that the “sheer 
extent” of injury to the Community’s financial interests 
from such conduct made tougher sanctions “a matter of 
urgency.”197  The Commission’s proposal encompasses 
liability based on negligence.  Pursuant to the proposal, 
corporate liability exists (1) when such offenses are 
committed by a representative of the corporation or person 
with authority to act on behalf of the corporation or (2) 
when the offense resulted from a lack of supervision or 
control within the corporation.198  Obviously aware of the 
continued resistance among some member states toward 
imposing full corporate criminal liability, the Commission 
stated that “changes need to be made . . . to national 
legislation, so that bodies corporate can be held responsible 
for acts of fraud, active corruption and money laundering 
. . . that damage or threaten to damage the financial 
interests of the Community.”199  Although the proposed 
directive expresses a strong preference for the 
criminalization of such conduct,200 it permits member states 
to adopt non-criminal sanctions against corporations, so 
long as they are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.”201  
With respect to natural persons who perpetrate corruption 
offenses, the directive states that corporate liability should 
not “exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons 
who are perpetrators, instigators or accessories in the 
fraud, active corruption, or money laundering.”202 
 
 196. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Criminal-Law Protection of the Community’s Financial Interests, COM (2001) 
272 (issued May 23, 2001), arts. 3, 4 and 6. 
 197. Id. explanatory memorandum, ¶ 1. 
 198. Id. art. 9. 
 199. Id. preamble, ¶ 11. 
 200. “Member States shall take the necessary measures to transpose the 
provisions of this Chapter [defining offenses] into their national criminal law in 
such a way that the conduct referred to therein constitutes criminal offences.”  Id. 
art. 7.  However, whereas article 8 of the proposed directive, id., requires that 
responsible individuals (e.g., corporate officers) should be criminally liable, article 
9 only requires that “bodies corporate” be “held liable,” thus leaving room for 
member states to proceed administratively or civilly against corporations. 
 201. Id. art. 11. 
 202. Id. art. 9.3. 
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d. Proposals related to Corporate Accounting 
Fraud 
On the heels of the Parmalat accounting scandal, the 
Commission issued a proposal for a directive requiring 
member states to adopt EU-wide standards for public 
company audits.203  This directive included a 
recommendation that member states adopt “dissuasive civil, 
administrative or criminal penalties” against auditors and 
audit firms in addition to civil sanctions in cases in which 
statutorily required audits failed to comply with the 
proposed EU-wide standards.204  One proposed sanction 
would withdraw “the approval of statutory auditors and of 
audit firms,”205 which would be the death knell of a public 
company audit firm.  Interestingly, however, the 
Commission’s overall approach to the recent corporate fraud 
scandals in Europe has not focused on the use of criminal 
sanctions.206  Similarly, France, Germany, and Italy have 
 
 203. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, issued March 16, 
2004, COM (2004) 177, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex. 
 204. Id. art. 30, ¶ 2. 
 205. Id. art. 30, ¶ 3. 
 206. Partly in response to this wave of corporate fraud (and also as a result of 
the EU’s policy to harmonize corporate governance in public companies among 
member states to promote more efficient capital markets), in May 2003, the 
Commission recommended that member states adopt new rules requiring 
increased financial transparency, greater shareholder rights, and more defined 
criteria for director remuneration and responsibilities.  See Communication from 
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of May 21, 2003, 
“Modernising Company Law and Enhancing corporate Governance in the 
European Union—A Plan to Move Forward,” COM (2003) 284.  However, the 
Commission did not propose additional criminal liability on directors, officers and 
auditors responsible for public company accounting fraud.  Here, the Commission 
declined to follow the policies of Sarbanes-Oxley, enacted less than a year earlier 
by the United States Congress.  See id.; see also Frits Bolkestein, member of the 
EU Commission’s group on the Internal Market, Address to the European Policy 
Forum London, (June 13, 2003), available in LEXIS at 2003 RAPID June 13, 
2003.  The Commission’s recommendations reflected its view that the wave of 
scandals indicated a need for fundamental corporate governance reform rather 
than a criminal law response. 
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made civil rather than criminal law the centerpiece of their 
responses to the recent corporate fraud scandals.207 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, there are 
several identifiable trends in Western Europe regarding 
the imposition of criminal liability on corporations.  There 
has been a general movement toward the imposition of 
corporate criminal liability, with the use of respondeat 
superior liability in addition to other liability standards 
that focus on managerial or organizational fault.  The new 
corporate criminal liability is intended to complement, not 
replace, the liability of individual actors.  Europe 
increasingly views corporate criminal liability as a needed 
deterrent and as a mechanism for condemning certain 
 
 207. In July 2003, the French legislature adopted legislation requiring greater 
transparency in financial statements and stricter auditing standards.  The 
legislation also required more disclosure of director stock holdings in the 
corporation.  Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old 
Europe on Post-Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 
911, 919 (2003).  This legislation emulated much of Sarbanes-Oxley’s financial 
reporting disclosure requirements.  Id.  The legislation also introduced criminal 
liability on non-traditional securities brokerage firms involved in certain public 
market investment activities in violation of the new requirements, and predicated 
such liability on article 121-2 of the new French penal code.  Traditional 
investment banks, such as Crédit Agricole S.A., and investment firms associated 
with the French bourse remain subject to strict regulations imposed elsewhere in 
French law on such firms.  Art. 44 of the Projet de loi de securite financiere 
(adopted by the French Senate Mar. 20, 2003), available at 
http:/www.senat.fr/leg/tas02-092.html. 
The German government has proposed legislation emulating Sarbanes-
Oxley’s disclosure and auditing requirements.  The proposed legislation would 
also make it easier for shareholders to bring actions for damages against 
individuals responsible for securities fraud.  Enriques, supra, at 920-21. A 
government commission is even exploring more fundamental reforms to the 
structure of the German corporate board.  Id. 
Italy also adopted new reforms aimed at curbing self-dealing by directors 
that were due to come into effect in January 2004.  Enriques, supra, at 924-25.  
However, Italy still has not completely reversed the “de-criminalization” of 
accounting and securities fraud that occurred in 2001, when the government 
passed legislation that made the prosecution of corporate officers for fraudulent 
accounting much more difficult by imposing a higher burden of proof on 
prosecutors and shortening the statute of limitations.  Id. at 922. 
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corporate conduct and reinforcing societal norms.  Finally, 
the use of criminal sanctions other than traditional 
monetary fines, while still not widespread, is now available 
to courts in at least one European country. 
The general movement toward imposing criminal 
liability began in the 1970s with legislation addressing a 
few offenses (particularly offenses relating to the economic 
markets and consumer protection208) and has now led to the 
adoption of comprehensive schemes for the imposition of 
criminal liability on corporations in Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.209  The use of 
corporate criminal liability was endorsed by the Council of 
Europe, which recommended in 1988 that member states 
adopt such liability comprehensively,210 and subsequently 
forwarded specific proposals addressing the criminal 
liability of corporations for environmental offenses and 
offenses involving fraud in government contracts.211  The 
European Union has made similar proposals of its own.212 
A few European countries have bucked the trend, 
choosing not to adopt corporate criminal liability, and 
instead employ administrative sanctions.213  In Germany 
these sanctions are regarded as quasi-criminal.214  It is 
questionable whether the hold-outs will continue to rely 
exclusively on civil or quasi-criminal sanctions.  Legal 
commentators and prosecutors in these countries, 
especially Germany and Italy, have argued that 
 
 208. See supra notes 75, 84, 89, 117, 180-186 and accompanying text (noting 
original use of criminal or quasi criminal sanctions for economic crimes in France, 
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and the EU).  Portugal also imposed vicarious 
liability on corporations for certain environmental and economic crimes.  See 
supra note 74. 
 209. See supra notes 89-119 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 161-65. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 168-79.  The European Union arguably 
began the modern discussion of corporate liability in Europe when the original 
EU body imposed civil sanctions on business enterprises for anti-competition 
abuses in the 1960s.  See supra notes 181, 185-86 (noting debate regarding penal 
nature of of EU’s anti-competition fines). 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 187-202. 
 213. See supra note 75 and notes 141-44 and accompanying text (noting that 
Germany, Italy, and Spain continue to use administrative sanctions). 
 214. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text. 
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administrative sanctions are less effective than criminal 
liability because they do not provide sufficient deterrence 
and do not inflict moral condemnation on the corporate 
offenders.215  Moreover, at least in Germany, individual 
criminal liability is provided for the commission of offenses 
on behalf of the corporation, but it has not been effective at 
controlling criminal conduct by corporations.216 
The second trend among those Western European 
countries adopting comprehensive liability schemes is the 
attempt to define a standard of fault that integrates 
respondeat superior liability with theories of corporate 
organizational fault.  The Netherlands, Denmark, and 
subsequently Finland have opted to impose respondeat 
superior liability as well as liability based on 
organizational or management failures.217  Switzerland has 
recently adopted respondeat superior liability for serious 
offenses that is qualified by requiring an additional 
showing that the corporation has not taken reasonable 
measures to prevent the offense.218  This qualification is 
also seen in the Council of Europe’s 1988 proposal.219  
France remains an exception to the trend, using a limited 
form of respondeat superior liability, although in the case 
of negligence-based offenses, the courts are relaxing that 
standard.220 
 
 215. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93 (the Netherlands), notes 100-105 
(Denmark), and notes 107 (Finland). 
 218. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra text accompanying note 164. 
 220. French law does not automatically impute criminal liability to a 
corporation based on the conduct of its lower-level employees, but requires a 
finding of individual criminal liability by senior management or delegated 
corporate representatives, except in the case of negligence offenses, where the law 
may impute liability to a corporation even when a senior officer is not personally 
liable for the offense.  This approach recognizes that it may be unfair to impose a 
criminal judgment on a corporation for the acts of any lower-level “rogue” 
employee.  Coffee, supra note 70, at 23.  As discussed in the preceding section, 
French law is very much in flux, as courts and scholars recognize that the 
extremely strict interpretation of article 121-2 originally adopted by the Court of 
Cassation does not appear to be practical in the case of most corporate offenses 
requiring intentional fault, and is in tension with negligence-based liability 
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The third noticeable trend concerns the maintenance 
of liability of natural persons: the states that have chosen 
to adopt comprehensive corporate criminal liability have 
not displaced the liability of natural persons for offenses 
they commit on behalf of the corporation.221  Similarly, 
various proposals of the Council of Europe and the 
European Union for corporate criminal liability state that 
individual liability on culpable managers should remain.222  
Thus, the introduction of criminal responsibility on 
corporations is seen as serving practical and moral 
purposes that are distinct from those served by the 
imposition of criminal responsibility on individuals acting 
on a corporation’s behalf. 
Finally, and relatedly, the scholarly commentary 
urging the adoption of corporate criminal liability has 
consistently reflected two purposes that scholars believe 
can only be served by the criminal law.  The first is the 
infliction of moral condemnation on the corporation itself 
when it commits an illegal act.  Such condemnation 
reinforces important social norms flouted by the 
corporation.  Some scholars have, accordingly, argued that 
the corporation represents a set of distinct interests, or has 
its own personality, and is therefore the appropriate 
subject of criminal stigma.223 
 
imposed on corporations through recent modification of article 121-3.  See supra 
notes 127-35 and accompanying text. 
 221. This is the case in France and the Netherlands, see supra text 
accompanying notes 94, 121-22, and appears to be the case in Denmark, see supra 
text accompanying notes 100-105 (Danish law does not appear to exlude 
individual liability when a corporation is liable) and Switzerland, although, as 
noted, the new Swiss provision for corporate criminal liability may deflect liability 
away from the corporation and back to the individual.  See supra notes 108-114 
and accompanying text.  Belgium, however, has not followed this trend.  See 
supra note 74. 
 222. See supra text accompanying note 165 (Council’s 1988 proposal), note 170 
(Council convention on environmental crimes), note 178 (Council convention on 
corruption), note 192 (EU Framework Decision on environmental offenses), and 
note 202 (proposed EU directive on corruption). 
 223. See supra note 75 and notes 80, 83, and accompanying text (noting 
comments of Italian and French scholars on distinctive harm created by corporate 
offenses). 
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The second of these purposes is an effective response to 
the widespread social harm caused by the illegal activities 
of increasingly economically dominant corporations.  
Several European commentators have remarked that 
neither administrative corporate liability nor individual 
criminal liability on corporate management has succeeded 
in deterring recidivist corporate misconduct, and that more 
punitive sanctions against corporate offenders are 
required.224  Proponents of such sanctions have succeeded 
in having them adopted in France.  These sanctions include 
measures designed to restrict management’s conduct of the 
corporation’s business and have been characterized as a 
form of corporate “imprisonment.”225  Although non-
monetary sanctions, such as revocation of licenses, were 
already available in countries such as Germany for 
administrative law violations,226 the new sanctions appear 
to provide more muscular deterrence against corporate 
misconduct. 
What do the European developments tell us about the 
arguments reviewed in section I?  At the most general 
level, the widespread adoption and expansion of corporate 
criminal liability in Europe suggests a widely shared 
perception that corporate criminal liability serves a 
valuable function in modern western democracies.  The 
European experience also provides a lens through which to 
reassess the specific critiques of subjecting corporations to 
the criminal law.  In considering these developments, we 
return to the major arguments we identified in section I. 
A. The European Experience and the Retributive Critique 
The retributive argument we reviewed in section I 
asserts that the function of criminal law is to impose 
blame, and shame, on individuals as a means of responding 
to the moral wrong inflicted by their conduct.227  According 
 
 224. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra note 140. 
 226. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41. 
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to this line of reasoning, the criminal law cannot be 
extended to corporations without losing its moral 
foundation, and hence its moral force.  Twenty-five years 
ago, most European nations shared the traditional notion 
that criminal sanctions were, by their nature, appropriate 
only for natural persons,228 and this view still holds sway in 
the few European nations that have not extended criminal 
liability to corporations.  In Italy, for example, the 
constitution provides that criminal responsibility “is 
personal,”229 and in Germany opposition to criminal liability 
is predicated, at least in part, on the principle of personal 
guilt and blameworthiness.230 
But, in the main, this jurisprudential concern has not 
carried the day in Western Europe.  As detailed in section 
II, the clear trend is to extend criminal liability to 
corporations, and the recommendations of the Council of 
Europe and the European Union are likely to reinforce the 
trend.  Moreover, the European trend also shows an 
attempt by legal scholars to un-moor corporate criminal 
liability from the classical notions of individual fault that 
are central to the retributive argument.  In Germany, for 
example, scholars have argued for a standard of corporate 
criminal liability based on a theory of organizational 
fault,231 and some French scholars have expressed the view 
that France’s limited respondeat superior liability does not 
reflect the realities of the interaction between a 
corporation’s management and its employees.232 
The developments in Europe reflect a growing 
recognition of the economic power wielded by corporations 
as well as the distinctive threats posed by that power, and 
a sense that criminal liability should be available to 
 
 228. See supra note 72.  But see supra note 70 (noting that the U.K. adopted a 
limited form of criminal responsibility based upon respondeat superior in the 
1950s), note 71 (Denmark had limited liability since 1926) and notes 89-90 and 
accompanying text (the Netherlands had limited corporate liability for economic 
crimes, and expanded it to comprehensive criminal liability in 1976). 
 229. See supra note 75. 
 230. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra text accompanying notes 152-56. 
 232. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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respond to corporate wrongdoing.233  Although the 
Europeans do not necessarily phrase it in these terms, it 
seems that the underlying assumption is utilitarian and 
pragmatic: the notion that society needs additional 
protection from corporate wrongdoing than has been 
provided by reliance on administrative or civil law.  One 
commentary on the Danish criminal code makes this point 
explicit: 
The justification for making legal persons liable for 
punishment is found in practical needs, including above all 
a desire to be able to sanction anonymous faults and to be 
able to adjust the level of a fine to the actual or assumed 
profit of a business (and not merely the financial situation 
of the perpetrator).  This is particularly called for where the 
actual perpetrator is a person in an inferior position 
receiving only a minor salary who has acted in the interest 
of the business.234 
There is, however, also some discussion of the need to 
hold corporations responsible, and to express society’s 
denunciation of certain forms of corporate misconduct.  The 
expressive function and social meaning of the new 
European criminal laws is discussed below.235 
B. The European Experience and the Economic Efficiency 
Critique 
As described more fully in section I, the law and 
economics efficiency critique is utilitarian in its orientation, 
seeking to weigh the costs and benefits of corporate 
criminal liability as opposed to corporate civil liability or 
criminal liability for individuals.  One facet of this 
 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87. 
 234. Langsted et al, supra note 98, at 48, ¶ 81.  The authors also comment that 
“Danish legislation as well as jurisprudence of penal law have traditionally been 
highly pragmatic, and philosophical considerations regarding guilt depending 
upon human actions and similar points of view have never gained much ground.”  
Id. at 47-48, ¶ 81. 
 235. See infra text accompanying notes 281-84. 
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argument is the claim that criminal liability is inefficient 
because it overdeters, causing precautionary behavior that 
is not socially beneficial.236  Another facet is the claim that 
the heightened procedural protections and reputational 
damages cause unnecessary and sometimes perverse social 
costs.237  Because the sanctions available and the 
procedures followed in each country in civil and criminal 
proceedings vary a good deal,238 the exact balance of costs 
and benefits varies from country to country as well.  
Accordingly, no close comparisons can be made between the 
utilitarian balance in the U.S. and that in Europe. 
There is, however, one distinction between the U.S. 
and European systems that may have predisposed the 
latter to turn to criminal sanctions as a mechanism to 
control corporate misconduct.  In comparison to the U.S., 
European states have traditionally relied more on 
administrative regulation239 and less on civil litigation to 
 
 236. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43. 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 45-51. 
 238. For a general discussion of criminal procedure in Western European 
countries, see Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure, A Worldwide Study (1999). 
Some of the procedures in the U.S. and Western Europe are similar.  For 
example, most countries have a heightened standard of proof in criminal cases, 
although each may use different terminology. In France, jurors must be 
thoroughly convinced of guilt to convict.  Id. at 173.  England, like the U.S., uses 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 122.  Jurors in Germany decide guilt based on 
factors which leave no room for reasonable doubt.  Thomas V. Mulrine, Note, 
Reasonable Doubt: How in the World Is It Defined?, 12 Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 
195, 220 (1997).  The Italian Constitution requires a definitive conviction (Id. at 
222), although recently the Italian Supreme Court has applied a standard that is 
comparable to the reasonable doubt standard.  See also Michele Taruffo, 
Rethinking the Standards of Proof, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 659 (2003) (arguing that 
while there is some overlap in the criminal and civil standards of proof in civil 
countries, generally, civil courts do not use as rigorous a standard as criminal 
courts).  But see Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of 
Standards of Proof, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 243 (2002) (arguing that most civil law 
countries use a heightened standard of proof for both civil and criminal trials). 
 239. In the last century, Western European countries chose to regulate 
corporate conduct primarily through administrative liability.  See Leigh, supra 
note 70, at 1522 (noting the availability of a “wide measure of administrative 
liability” in European countries, including those that do not have criminal 
liability); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 45, 64 (2002) (noting that after the 
French Revolution, corporate criminal liability “fell into disfavor,” in part because 
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control and sanction corporate conduct in areas such as 
protection of consumers,240 the environment,241 and business 
competition.242  The civil remedies available in many 
European nations are underdeveloped as compared to those 
in the U.S.  In some contexts, private plaintiffs may sue for 
injunctive relief, but not compensatory damages.243  In 
other contexts, compensatory damages are available, but 
not punitive damages.244  Thus the addition of corporate 
criminal liability may reflect, in part, the Europeans’ 
 
“corporate-style institutions were disbanded”). 
 240. France and Italy, for example, enforce consumer protection laws through 
“strong, detailed regulation, largely sanctioned through criminal or 
administrative law measures.”  Frauke Henning-Bodewig, Unfair Competition 
and Misleading Advertising: The Approach to Regulation in the Continental EC 
States (Including the EC Directive on Misleading Advertising), 54 Antitrust L. J. 
551, 555 (1985). 
 241. Throughout Western Europe, environmental laws are enforced through 
administrative regulations and sanctions, though with varying degrees of 
deterrent effectiveness.  See generally Michael Faure & Günter Heine, 
Environmental Criminal Law in the European Union (Max Planck Institute 2000) 
(canvassing member state environmental criminal law regimes). 
 242. In the area of competition laws, “both the German laws and the 
competition rules of the European Economic Community provide for heavy 
penalties.”  Leigh, supra note 70, at 1523. 
 243. Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain and Switzerland, for example, have 
granted consumer associations standing to seek injunctions without damages 
against businesses for violations of consumer law, such as misleading advertising.  
Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 Duke J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 369, 375 (2001); Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under 
EU and German Law, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 355, 359-60 (2001).  Some 
states, such as Norway and Sweden, have a “Consumer Ombudsman” that may 
seek to enjoin business practices.  Koch, supra, at 362. 
 244. Although some countries have adopted procedures that allow the award of 
compensatory damages to groups of injured plaintiff groups in tort cases, 
European systems have not generally authorized punitive damages.  See Koch, 
supra note 243, at 360-61 (noting difference between public interest style suits 
and claimant group suit in tort cases).  There are already some indications, 
however, that European nations may move further to expand civil liability.  
Courts in France and Greece have begun to award punitive damages in civil suits 
brought by associations.  Id. at 360.  Increasingly, the European Union is also 
recommending that member states adopt private plaintiff civil actions against 
corporations in various fields, such as securities law.  See, e.g., COM 2003/284, 
supra note 206, ¶ 3.1.3 (proposing shareholder right to seek official investigation 
into company’s affairs); COM 2004/177, supra note 203, art. 30 (encouraging 
member states to provide “effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, 
administrative or criminal penalties” against audit firms). 
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greater reliance on the state, rather than private litigants, 
to respond to corporate misconduct.  In effect, criminal 
liability has given the state the option of seeking more 
serious sanctions to respond to greater societal harm. 
In addition, several other points emerge from the 
European experience.  First, some aspects of the new 
legislation seem to take account of efficiency 
considerations, broadly defined, since they impose criminal 
liability on the corporation where other options are limited 
or unavailable.  Some of the corporate criminal statutes 
were designed to plug a gap in the existing legal 
framework, as in the case where no responsible individual 
can be identified.245  Similarly, German scholars and 
prosecutors are advocating corporate criminal liability on 
the ground that corporations are able to structure their 
transactions to avoid most individual liability, and further 
dilute the deterrent effect of the current laws by 
indemnifying the few individuals who are prosecuted.246  
More generally, Europe clearly intends corporate criminal 
liability to serve as an additional tool, not a substitute for 
other—possibly more effective—sanctions against 
corporations themselves or individuals.247 
On the other hand, as far as we can tell, the European 
dialogue concerning the creation of corporate criminal 
liability shows little sign of the influence of law and 
economics considerations, such as the relative efficiency of 
 
 245. See, e.g, supra text accompanying note 90 (noting that Dutch law has 
dispensed with predicating corporate liability on conduct of a natural person), 
notes 103 and 107 (noting Danish and Finnish law, respectively, do not require 
identifying individual wrongdoer who performed the corporate offense), and notes 
108-114 (noting that under Swiss law, corporation liable for some offenses where 
individual wrongdoer is not identified, and always liable for certain serious 
offenses regardless of individual liability). 
 246. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 165, 170, 178, 192, and 202 (noting 
that Council of Europe and European Union initiatives do not displace individual 
liability and also contemplate civil and administrative remedies).  This does not 
guarantee, however, that in practice the availability of corporate liability will not 
tend to shield individuals.  See Khanna, supra note 54, at 17-18, 21-23, 8 n.40 
(arguing that in the U.S., corporate interests favor corporate liablity and lobby 
against increased enforcement of individual liability, although formally there is 
no barrier to individual liability). 
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different legal options, or concerns about perverse 
incentives or the potential for under- or overdeterrence.  
The push to adopt criminal sanctions reflects a consensus 
that new and stronger tools are needed to respond to the 
potential for widespread damage from corporate 
misconduct,248 but there is relatively little systematic 
discussion of the distinctive costs and benefits to enacting 
or enlarging corporate criminal liability.  Although some 
opponents of corporate criminal liability in France 
expressed concern that criminal sanctions would be 
redundant of existing administrative fines and would fall 
heavily on shareholders, employees, and creditors,249 those 
arguments do not seem to have received the same thorough 
and critical discussion given to doctrinal arguments in the 
U.S. against corporate criminal liability.  This lack of 
emphasis might reflect the conclusion that criminal 
sanctions are efficient, or that efficiency concerns are not 
an appropriate basis for assessing the propriety of criminal 
sanctions, but it seems equally plausible that European 
scholars have not employed law and economics scholarship 
to analyze these questions.250 
 
 248. This view is reflected on the national level, see, e.g., supra note 75 
(Paliero, arguing for corporate criminal law in Italy, noted that the “more 
invasive activities” of corporations cannot be controlled without punitive 
sanctions), and at the broader transnational level, see, e.g., supra text 
accompanying notes 161-62 (Council of Europe endorsed criminal liability because 
activities beneficial to corporations were causing considerable damage for which 
responsible officials could not be identified), and at the level of the EU, see supra 
text accompanying notes 196-97 (Commission finding that injury to EU’s financial 
interests made tougher sanctions for bribery of European Union funds and money 
laundering urgent). 
 249. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 250. It appears that law and economics scholarship plays a less prominent role 
in Europe than in the United States.  For example, there are eight law and 
economics journals in the U.S., and only one in Europe.  Richard A. Posner, Law 
and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and Developing Nations, 17 Ratio 
Juris. 66, 66 n.1 (2004).  In describing the wide influence law and economics 
scholarship has in the U.S. and arguing that it can play a similar role in civil law 
countries, Judge Posner seems to imply that it has not yet achieved this 
prominence outside the U.S.  See id. at 66-67.  In general, it appears that to date 
European law and economics has been more concerned with private law than with 
public law.  See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Economics (1997) 
(discussing, inter alia, property, private trusts, and torts). 
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The European move towards corporate criminal 
liability also reflects, among some proponents, a sense that 
criminal sanctions express and reinforce certain social 
norms.  The impact of expressing and reinforcing social 
norms can, of course, be factored in a utilitarian calculus,251 
but we did not observe European commentators discussing 
the normative value of criminal sanctions against 
corporations in these terms.  The expressive and norm 
building functions of criminal law, as argued by European 
commentators, are discussed below in subsection D.252 
C. The European Experience and the Public Choice 
Critique 
As noted in section II, a public choice perspective 
suggests that corporate criminal liability may be enacted 
not because it is an effective and important response to 
corporate wrongdoing, but rather because it is relatively 
inefficient or ineffective, and hence the least objectionable 
to politically powerful corporate interests.253  Corporate 
liability is thus dangerous in both the legislative and 
prosecutorial contexts, because it will tend to substitute for 
more effective sanctions, leading to underdeterrence of 
corporate wrongdoing.  Extending this analysis 
internationally, we might predict that powerful corporate 
interests in Europe, like those in the U.S., will employ their 
political influence to steer the system towards corporate 
criminal liability only when it serves their interests to do 
so.  This bleak picture of the legislative process suggests 
that it will seldom be the case that one can find desirable 
models in the statutory laws of any democratic nation 
(though the common law may produce efficient rules254). 
 
 251. For a forceful statement of this position, see Kahan, supra note 62, at 617; 
see also supra text accompanying notes 62-63. 
 252. See infra text accompanying notes 280-85. 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.  Consistent with this theory, it 
appears that corporations have raised stronger opposition to criminal liability for 
corporate agents and to civil liability for entities than to corporate criminal 
liability.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 254. Law and economics scholars have traditionally argued that the common 
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Although there is certainly some explanatory power in 
the public choice critique of the U.S. legislative process, 
this analysis cannot be transferred directly to the 
experience in Europe.  Because the various western 
democracies have different political traditions and culture, 
as well as different governmental structures and 
institutions (including key variations regarding the 
strength of political parties and the distribution of legal 
sovereignty), the role of interest groups in each varies.255  
Even allowing for this variation, it seems clear that the role 
of interest groups in European politics is not entirely 
comparable to the role of such groups in U.S. policies.  The 
relative weakness of the party system in the U.S. 
contributes to the power of U.S. interest groups, which 
have much more influence in the electoral process than 
their counterparts in Europe.256  There are significant 
 
law evolves toward efficient rules.  See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic 
Analysis of the Law 25-26, 573-75 & n. 1 (6th ed. 2003); Oona A. Hathaway, Path 
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common 
Law System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 637-38 (2001).  In recent years, however, 
various challenges to this view have been made.  See, e.g., Hathaway, supra, at 
638 (observing that path dependence theory suggests that rules such as stare 
decisis may preclude common law courts from reaching efficient results), and 
Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply 
Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1551 (2003) (noting the evolution away from the 
traditional view of the common law’s efficiency because of interest group 
pressures on litigation, and offering a supply side as well as a demand side 
account of the pressures that shape common law decision making).  For more 
general evolutionary analyses of law, see E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary 
Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 38 (1985), and Owen D. Jones, 
Proprioception, Non-Law and Biolegal History, 53 Fla. L. Rev. 831 (2001). 
 255. Clive S. Thomas, Interest Groups in Western Democracies: Contemporary 
Characteristics and Future Directions, in First World Interest Groups, A 
Comparative Perspective 223-24 (Clive S. Thomas ed., 1993) [hereinafter First 
World Interest Groups].  At least during periods in their history, several of the 
Western European states have a corporatist structure, with well defined national 
interest groups and unions that are formally consulted by the government.  Clive 
S. Thomas, The American Interest Group System, Typical Model or Aberration?, 
in First World Interest Groups, supra, at 41 [hereinafter Typical Model or 
Aberration].  See Yves Meny, Government and Politics in Western Europe 152 
(Janet Lloyd trans., 2d ed. 1993).  These “peak associations” organize the other 
interest groups, and represent them in negotiations or enforce any agreement 
that would be made; such associations are lacking in the U.S.  Clive, Typical 
Model or Aberration, supra, at 42. 
 256. Clive, Typical Model or Aberration, supra note 255, at 43.  The U.S. PACs 
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differences in the relationship between interest groups and 
government in the U.S. and various European nations, and 
in the tactics and strategies that interest groups use to 
influence government.257 
Moreover, as noted by comparative political science 
analysts, some of the European nations that have enacted 
corporate criminal liability have bureaucracies that are 
more insulated from interest groups, and also have political 
party systems that are much more powerful than the party 
system in the United States.  In particular, France has a 
powerful executive, an insulated bureaucracy, and parties 
that are not likely to be controlled by special interests.258  
Although business leaders (and representatives of trade) 
are among the most likely to be consulted, French political 
leaders with clear policy preferences are generally 
successful in imposing these views.259  In this situation the 
government may consult the affected groups as a formality, 
but if interest groups are not consulted or if their positions 
are not influential, they have little recourse but to 
protest.260  This appears to have been the case with the 
1992 adoption of the French provisions creating 
comprehensive corporate criminal liability.  Despite the 
opposition of the business community, the legislature 
followed the recommendation of the French law reform 
commission.261  Subsequently, in July 2000, the French 
 
strengthen the relationship between groups and individual elected officials or 
candidates, decreasing the strength of political parties in the U.S.  Id. at 41. The 
weak political parties contribute to the “fragmented nature of the American 
policymaking process.”  Id. 
 257. Id. at 49.  Several key mechanisms used by interest groups in the U.S., 
such as paid professional lobbyists, are less prevalent in Europe.  Id. at 37, 39.  
Influencing the election of candidates through PACs, which tend to represent 
business interests, is virtually unheard of in other western democracies.  Id. at 
46.  PACs tend to be dominated by business interest groups, and tend not to 
represent the interests of promotional groups, i.e., public interest or single-issue 
groups promoting a social ideal or cause, such as the ACLU or Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving.  Id. at 41. 
 258. Frank L. Wilson, France: Group Politics in a Strong State, in First World 
Interest Groups, supra note 255, at 114-15, 122. 
 259. Id. at 124-25. 
 260. Id. at 125. 
 261. In an interview with one of the co-authors, Marie-Christine Monsallier-
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legislature expanded negligence-based corporate criminal 
liability, placing into question the Court of Cassation’s 
overly narrow reading of the scope of liability under the 
1992 law.262 
Therefore, the development of corporate criminal 
liability in the various European nations does not seem to 
have followed the script suggested by the public choice 
critique.  The process varied considerably from country to 
country in Europe,263 and seldom if ever followed the 
paradigm assumed by the public choice critique—corporate 
interests urging legislators to adopt criminal liability to 
avoid more effective sanctions against corporations.  It does 
not appear that recent European legislation was a 
substitute for other civil or administrative remedies or 
individual criminal liability.  Rather, corporate criminal 
liability was seen as a necessary adjunct to existing 
provisions that may or may not have more bite.  This is 
particularly clear in the case of Swiss law, which provides 
for corporate criminal liability when fault cannot be 
attributed to an individual within the organization.264  
Swiss law also provides for corporate criminal liability in 
the case of a group of offenses that are often facilitated by 
the corporate form of organization (money laundering, 
bribery, corruption, organizational crime, and the financing 
 
Saint Mleux observed that in general, French legislative reform commissions tend 
to be formed exclusively of legislators, though well known legal scholars 
sometimes have significant access to legislative reform commissions.  These 
legislators receive informal input from both the academic community and other 
representatives of affected interest groups, although the latter do not play as 
central a role in the drafting of legislation as they do in the United States.  
Interview with Marie-Christine Monsallier-Saint Mleux, Docteur en droit, Maitre 
de conférences à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Lille II, in New York, New 
York (June 6, 2004) (interview notes on file with authors). 
 262. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
 263. The Netherlands and Denmark, for example, incrementally introduced 
corporate criminal liability, see supra text accompanying notes 89-99, whereas 
France took years to debate it before finally introducing it, for the first time, 
comprehensively.  See supra text accompanying notes 116-17. 
 264. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  Similarly, one basis for 
criminal liability under Finnish law is the absence of an identified wrongdoer 
coupled with the corporation’s lack of the care and diligence necessary to prevent 
the offense.  See supra text accompanying note 107. 
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of terrorism), regardless of whether a wrongdoer has been 
identified, when the corporation has failed to take 
reasonable and necessary measures to prevent the 
offense.265  This would suggest that with respect to such 
offenses, criminal sanctions are viewed as desirable.  
Further, some nations have addressed the concern that the 
new provisions not act as a substitute or shield for culpable 
individuals.  The French code provides that a corporation’s 
criminal liability does not shield a natural person who is a 
perpetrator or accomplice of the same act.266  Dutch law 
allows the prosecution to charge the corporation and/or the 
responsible corporate official(s).267 
Similarly, the European experience strays from the 
public choice critique’s script in another way.  That critique 
suggests that criminal liability is usually the result of a 
scandal that generates public outcry and a demand for a 
hasty legislative response to corporate wrongdoing.268  To 
the contrary, in several European countries, criminal 
liability was enacted as a result of a lengthy deliberative 
process in which legal scholars who supported such liability 
played a significant role.  Europeans held academic 
congresses to address corporate criminal liability in 1978, 
1979, and 1993.269  In France, adoption came after more 
than a decade of debate, as legal scholars and legislators 
sought new means to hold increasingly powerful economic 
entities responsible for their conduct within society.270  
Similarly, in Germany much of the impetus to consider 
 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22. 
 267. See supra text accompanying note 94. 
 268. See Khanna, supra note 54, at 21-22 (noting that response to corporate 
accounting scandals was to enact Sarbanes-Oxley, not to repeal recent limitations 
on scope of civil liability).  At the same time, events such as the provision of blood 
tainted with HIV in France, see supra note 86 and accompanying text, and the 
nuclear disaster at Chernobyl were also in important ingredient in the debate 
about the need for additional laws to regulate and sanction corporate wrongdoing.  
Although Chernobyl involved a government nuclear plant, it was a dramatic 
example of the catastrophic harm that can occur as a result of an industrial 
accident. 
 269. See supra note 76. 
 270. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88 and 115-19. 
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corporate criminal legislation appears to be coming from 
academics, who have noted that the current system of 
administrative liability woefully under-deters corporate 
offenders.271 
The recent corporate accounting scandals provide an 
interesting test of this aspect of the public choice analysis, 
since there has been a genuine public outcry and new laws 
have and are being adopted in the U.S. and Europe.  But in 
Europe, the result has not been knee-jerk adoption of new 
criminal laws.  Although a few new criminal provisions 
have been adopted, both the European Union and the 
individual European states have emphasized civil 
provisions, particularly stricter standards for accounting 
and audits, increased financial transparency, greater 
shareholder rights, and defined criteria for directors’ 
responsibility and remuneration.272 
Moreover, the European Union’s support for certain 
forms of corporate criminal liability poses an additional 
challenge to the public choice argument.  The European 
Union has called upon its member states to enact criminal 
legislation to deal with four particularly pressing problems 
that characteristically involve corporate activity: 
environmental crimes, government contract fraud, bribery 
directed at the use of European Union funds, and money 
laundering.273  These proposals, which emanate from the 
Commission of the European Union and must be approved 
by the Council of the European Union, are the result of a 
quite different political process than the national laws 
referred to above. The multi-level structure of EU 
policymaking creates a system that is too complex for one 
type of interest group, such as business interests, to 
dominate.274  The necessity of influencing multiple branches 
 
 271. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 187-202.  As noted, these are similar to 
proposals made by the Council of Europe.  See supra text accompanying notes 
168-80. 
 274. The European Union has a tripartite structure, involving the Council of 
Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, and 
lobbyists must learn about each, and their interactions.  Sam Lowenberg, For 
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of government and the diffuse power structure can serve to 
fragment business interests and “insulate” policymaking 
from private interests compared to the more direct lobbying 
process employed in individual states.275  Traditional 
interest groups that had focused on lobbying national 
governments found this tactic increasingly ineffective as 
the EU moved toward integration, and each nation state 
lost conclusive veto power after the implementation of 
qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers.276  At 
the level of the EU, new nontraditional qualifications were 
necessary to gain influence, such as the creation of a 
“European identity” and the establishment of pan-
European alliances.277  Although business interests in the 
EU are the most organized private interest in civil 
society,278 their task is much more daunting than private 
interests who can be successful operating at a national 
level.  Lobbying at the European Union has been compared 
to playing three dimensional chess.279 
 
American Businesses, Lobbying the European Union Has Become a Priority, 
Legal Times, March 8, 1999, at 1.  Until the admission of new states in 2004, 
interest groups had to contend with fifteen different nation-states, each of whom 
support different policies, social norms, and political goals, and seven different 
political coalitions, none of whom controls a majority.  Id. This translates into a 
process that requires coalition building and compromise in order to achieve 
passage of any directive or regulation.  Justin Greenwood, Interest 
Representation in the European Union, 2 (2003). 
 275. Traditional lobbying techniques used by businesses are unsuccessful at 
the EU level.  The single market adopted in Europe makes bare threats by 
businesses to leave the market irrelevant; legislators are rarely elected directly by 
the public so constituent pressure is nonexistent; and large “war chests” do not 
necessarily gain businesses more influence because wining and dining individual 
politicians cannot create the political coalitions needed to advance legislation.  
Lowenberg, supra note 274, at 1. 
 276. David Coen, The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Large-
firm Lobbying in the European Union and Member States 18 J. Pub. Pol’y, 75, 77 
(1998). 
 277. Id. at 77-78. 
 278. Greenwood, supra note 274, at 75. 
 279. Id. (quoting Brad Staples, joint managing director of APCO Europe). 
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D. The European Experience and the American Defenses of 
Corporate Criminal Liability 
As we have noted, another group of American legal 
scholars have argued that corporate criminal liability can 
be justified on several grounds (although there are 
additional procedural requirements).  Such liability plays 
an important role in expressing and reinforcing important 
social norms by denouncing violations of those norms.  
Such liability also serves a variety of pragmatic 
considerations.280  We now turn to examining how the 
European experience bears on these arguments in support 
of corporate criminal liability. 
1. The Role of Moral Sanction 
The developments in Europe provide some support for 
the notion that criminal law plays a role in reinforcing 
important norms of corporate conduct and shaming or 
stigmatizing irresponsible corporate actors.  In the debates 
leading up to the adoption of the laws in question, some 
European theorists justified criminal liability on the 
ground that only corporate sanctions can express society’s 
moral opprobrium.281  Commentators expressed the view 
that in modern economies corporate wrongdoing 
represented a significant and distinctive form of 
delinquency to which the law should respond.  In France, 
commentators expressed the view that corporations should 
be held responsible, using the language of guilt and 
blame.282  Consistent with that notion, one of the sanctions 
authorized by French law is the posting of notices in the 
media.283  Similarly, a commentator referred to the Dutch 
corporate criminal sanctions as designed to inflict “grief” 
and focus on “moral intention,” in contrast to the 
 
 280. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69. 
 281. See, e.g., supra note 75 (noting comments of Paliero and Militello) and 
note 80 and accompanying text (Tiedemann discussing academic perspective). 
 282. See supra notes 83 and 85 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
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administrative regime’s focus on “reparation.”284  But as we 
observed in discussing retribution,285 this theme may have 
been less important to European proponents of corporate 
criminal liability than pragmatic considerations. 
2. The Adoption of Standards of Liability that 
Integrate Respondeat Superior with Theories of 
Organizational Failure 
Some of the European nations whose corporate 
liability schemes we discussed in part II are attempting to 
define a standard for corporate criminal liability that will 
encourage responsible corporate behavior and sanction 
conduct that falls seriously short of that standard.  The 
Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and, most recently, 
Switzerland have adopted standards of liability that 
combine respondeat superior liability with theories of 
management or organizational failure.  France stands 
alone in adopting a far more limited standard of corporate 
liability.  French law permits liability to be imputed to a 
corporation for offenses requiring intentional fault only 
where it can be shown that a high level officer or agent is 
also personally criminally responsible for the offense.286  For 
negligence-based offenses, French law appears to be 
 
 284. See supra note 89. 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 233-35. 
 286. French law is thus even more limited in the application of respondeat 
superior liability to the corporation than the Model Penal Code’s formulation of 
respondeat superior liability for offenses that have not been specifically imposed 
on corporations by the legislature.  See Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962) (“A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an 
offense if . . . the commission of the offenses was authorized, requested, 
commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a 
high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his 
office or employment.”) (emphasis added).  Moreover, unlike the Model Penal 
Code, French law only permits a corporation to be responsible for offenses that 
are specifically identified as corporate offenses by the legislature.  Furthermore, 
for offenses specifically identified by the legislature, the Model Penal Code relaxes 
the standard of respondeat superior liability.  See Model Penal Code § 2.01(1)(a) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).  As discussed supra note 129 and 132, this narrow 
interpretation of French corporate liability is under review by French scholars 
urging its relaxation. 
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adopting a more relaxed standard of respondeat superior 
liability. 
Although the use of respondeat superior liability was 
probably borrowed from the American model of corporate 
criminal liability, those countries that do use it have not 
chosen to displace it with another standard of liability 
when their legislatures enacted comprehensive schemes, 
but instead have supplemented it.  Thus, at least implicitly, 
the continued use of respondeat superior liability reflects a 
general consensus among legislators and perhaps even 
scholars that it is an appropriate standard for corporate 
liability. 
At the same time, these countries, with the exception 
of France, have included another component to corporate 
criminal liability—an examination of management’s role in 
supervising and organizing the corporation.  The focus on 
corporate organization has been termed the “deficient” or 
“defective” organizational model.  This approach permits 
responsibility to be imputed to a corporation when the 
corporation is unable to show that management has been 
reasonably diligent in the conduct of its affairs or when the 
organization of the corporation is shown to be “deficient” or 
“defective” such that a responsible person cannot be 
identified.287  The managerial/organizational approach 
prevents a corporation from shielding itself from liability 
where it is clear an offense has occurred but a responsible 
individual cannot be identified, and thus reaches corporate 
misconduct that vicarious liability may fail to capture.288 
 
 287. The concept of “organizational deficiency” is still being developed by legal 
scholars and the courts.  See supra note 114 (noting introduction of concept into 
Swiss law in 2003) and supra text accompanying notes 153-54 (proposals of 
German scholars for standard of liability).  Moreover, the concept of 
organizational deficiency overlaps with management’s reasonable oversight and 
conduct of the corporation, in that management is necessarily responsible for 
corporate chains of command, the organization of different departments within 
the corporation, and channels of communication. 
 288. This discussion is relevant in cases where the offense requires proof of at 
least negligent conduct by the corporation, but is obviously inapplicable where the 
law creates strict liability. 
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Although these countries combine respondeat superior 
liability with the management/organizational standard, 
they do so in different ways.  The approach of the 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland seemingly permits 
courts to liberally apply all these theories of liability as 
may suit the facts of the offense.289  The Swiss approach to 
serious offenses qualifies the use of respondeat superior 
liability with an examination of organizational deficiencies 
and the quality of management’s oversight.290  If 
management can show that it took all necessary measures 
to prevent the offense, the corporation may avoid vicarious 
liability for the act of an employee.  As noted, French law, 
as interpreted by the judiciary, does not adequately account 
for organizational deficiencies or high level managerial 
delinquency, but French scholars have urged a more 
expansive interpretation of the law.291 
It is unclear how these different standards of corporate 
criminal liability will play themselves out in the actual 
 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 91-107. 
 290. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.  Similarly, the Council of 
Europe’s 1988 proposal permits a corporation to avoid vicarious liability when 
management is not “implicated in the offense and has taken all the necessary 
steps to prevent its commission.”  See Council Recommendation No. R (88) 18, 
supra note 161, ¶ 2 and ¶ 4.  As noted, in the case of non-serious offenses, the 
Swiss statute actually shields a corporation from liability for the conduct of an 
employee, unless the corporation’s organization prevents the identification of a 
responsible employee.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
The Swiss approach to serious offenses and the Council of Europe’s 1988 
proposal are similar to the Model Penal Code’s limitation of respondeat superior 
liability based on the conduct of lower level employees, in cases in which “the 
[corporate] defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high 
managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the 
offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.”  See Model Penal Code 
§ 2.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
Although the Council of Europe’s 1988 proposal for general corporate 
criminal liability was not adopted, it appears to have influenced the scholarly 
debate in member states.  See, e.g, Möhrenschlager, supra note 74, at 94-95 
(discussing the Council’s 1988 Recommendation as a “milestone”).  Moreover, both 
the Council of Europe and the EU’s policymakers continue to urge member states 
to adopt a management-focused approach to corporate criminal liability, as 
evident in their recommendations urging criminal liability for government fraud, 
corruption in government contracting, and money laundering.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 168-202. 
 291. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
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prosecution of cases.  On the one hand, the emphasis on 
corporate organization and managerial oversight permits 
prosecutors to hold corporations liable for offenses 
requiring a demonstration of some degree of mens rea by 
the corporation even when a responsible individual cannot 
be identified.  At the same time, it prevents management 
from deflecting liability onto lower level employees by 
structuring the corporation so as to insulate management.  
On the other hand, if a corporation is able to show that its 
management took reasonably necessary steps to guard 
against the commission of the offense, it may be more 
difficult for European prosecutors to prove liability than 
their U.S. counterparts, even when the law provides for 
vicarious liability.292 
3. The Use of Alternative Non-Monetary Sanctions 
Of equal significance to European proponents of 
corporate criminal liability is the idea that new criminal 
sanctions are more effective tools in attempting to manage 
the potential for widespread harm as a result of the 
enormous power wielded by corporations.293  Most 
European countries continue to rely on monetary 
sanctions.294  However, alternative sanctions are available 
 
 292. U.S. federal prosecutors are encouraged to exploit the full scope of 
respondeat superior liability in pursuing criminal charges against corporations.  
The fact that a corporation’s management has previously instituted a compliance 
program or is being cooperative with investigators should not presumptively 
weigh against an initial charging decision.  Prosecutors should consider such 
factors during the plea and sentencing stage.  See Memorandum of Larry D. 
Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations, United States Department of Justice, January 20, 2003.  
Another factor that must be considered in assessing the comparative success of 
prosecutions of corporations (which is beyond the scope of this article) is the 
extent to which national legislatures impose strict-liability offenses on 
corporations. 
 293. See supra note 75 (Militello discussing need to integrate corporate crime 
into notion of criminal law to address corporate crime); supra text accompanying 
notes 85-86 (French commentators discussing harm from corporate conduct); 
supra note 151 (noting inadequacy of sanctions in Germany). 
 294. Switzerland’s 2003 law provides only for the use of monetary sanctions.  
See Wittmer, supra note 109, § 4(e).  German law, however, provides for limited 
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in France and also have support from the EU, the Council 
of Europe, and some German proponents of corporate 
criminal liability.  Both the French statute and the Council 
of Europe’s 1988 proposal provide for non-monetary 
sanctions that can control a corporation’s prospective 
behavior in ways that civil monetary fines cannot.  Some of 
these sanctions seek to supervise or replace management 
that was at the helm when the offense was conducted.  The 
French code permits a court to supervise management’s 
conduct of the corporation, such as its ability to enter into 
major contracts on the corporation’s behalf,295 and the 
Council of Europe’s 1988 proposal goes a step further, 
providing for the appointment of a replacement 
management group.296  Another type of sanction restricts 
the corporation’s business operations.  Thus, a corporation 
may be prohibited from advertising its goods and services, 
prohibited from seeking to raise financing through the 
issuance of debt, limited in its ability to issue checks and 
lines of credit, and prohibited from receiving certain 
government benefits and licenses.297  A third type of 
sanction is designed to shame the corporation—such as the 
announcement of a corporation’s conviction in the media or 
its listing on a registry of corporate offenders.298  A final 
type of sanction is the equivalent of a corporate death 
penalty: both the French statute and the Council of 
Europe’s 1988 proposal provide for the dissolution of a 
corporation in extreme cases of criminal delinquency.299 It 
remains to be seen whether French courts will utilize these 
sanctions with regularity or simply apply monetary fines, 
and whether other European countries will adopt some of 
the more aggressive non-monetary sanctions.300 
 
non-monetary sanctions against corporations found in violation of civil and 
administrative regulations.  See supra note 143. 
 295. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 140, 166, and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 140, 166, and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 140, 166, and accompanying text. 
 300. In the United States, monetary fines have been supplemented with 
corporate monitoring, giving prosecutors and courts some input into corporate 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The developments in Europe provide an interesting 
contrast to the American experience, but it is too soon to 
draw any clear lessons beyond the most basic point that 
corporate criminal liability may play a more useful role in 
both Europe and the United States than its U.S. detractors 
believe.  European nations increasingly see corporate 
criminal liability as an important option for controlling and 
responding to corporate misconduct, though Germany and 
Italy are important exceptions: those countries employ 
quasi-criminal administrative sanctions that appear to 
satisfy the EU and Council of Europe’s recommendations for 
corporate liability. 
There is no European consensus on the standard for 
corporate liability.  Although many European countries 
base criminal liability on respondeat superior, it is often 
complemented with liability based on organizational or 
management failures.  We cannot predict which theory or 
theories of liability will predominate, but it seems likely 
that the role of management in supervising the 
corporation’s affairs and in organizing the corporation will 
be an important element of European corporate criminal 
liability.  Significantly, German and French scholars have 
emphasized an organizational or management-role inquiry 
into criminal responsibility rather than focusing solely on 
respondeat superior liability.  Moreover, to the extent that 
 
remedial measures.  See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 8D1.4 (November 1, 2003).  As a result of 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the 2004 amendments to the federal 
sentencing guidelines emphasize the need to structure internal remedies that 
promote an “ethos” or corporate ethic of compliance with the law.  See, e.g., 
U.S.S.G. § 8B2.1(b)(2)-(b)(6) (increasing training requirements for corporate 
compliance programs and requiring greater oversight and enforcement of same). 
Such remedies can include ethics training for corporate employees.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 8B2.1(b)(4).  However, other non-monetary sanctions have not been widely 
adopted in the United States; they have not been widely discussed by scholars, 
particularly law and economics scholars, despite some creative proposals for more 
effective sanctions.  See Coffee, supra note 44, at 387, 413-18 (proposing replacing 
monetary criminal fines with an equity fine, in which the corporation would be 
required to issue a block of voting stock to a victims trust fund that could transfer 
the stock without restriction). 
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the EU and the Council of Europe’s recommendations in 
this area influence different academic, legislative, and 
judicial communities within the member states, the 
message from those European intergovernmental 
organizations is that the role of management should be an 
important factor in drafting standards for corporate 
criminal liability.  The European focus on organizational 
failure as a complement to respondeat superior liability 
should be broadly consistent with the anticipated combined 
effect of the post-Sarbanes-Oxley federal sentencing 
guidelines and the respondeat superior standard of federal 
criminal liability.301  This focus is also consistent with 
arguments by U.S. scholars in favor of a standard such as 
corporate ethos.302 
It is too soon to say whether the European initiatives 
will be successful in reducing or responding to corporate 
wrongdoing.  Many of the provisions are relatively new, 
and we know little about their implementation.  Moreover, 
Europeans are also developing new civil and administrative 
provisions, and we cannot predict which provisions will 
prove to be most useful.  This leads us to one final 
observation.  The notion of path dependence highlights the 
importance of the previous developments in each legal 
system, which set the stage for each subsequent set of 
reforms.303  For example, we noted above that many 
European nations lack some of the procedural and 
substantive legal provisions that make civil litigation an 
effective response to corporate behavior in the U.S.  This 
distinction may explain why corporate criminal liability 
appears to be gaining favor in Europe, while in the U.S. its 
detractors argue in favor of civil remedies.  The regulatory 
framework, the procedural rules, and the other remedies 
that are available vary from nation to nation.  Those 
differences will play a role in determining the next steps 
that legal systems in Europe and in the U.S. will take to 
address corporate misconduct.  We acknowledge that there 
 
 301. See supra notes 291, 299, and 300. 
 302. See, e.g., Bucy, supra note 2, at 1099. 
 303. See Hathaway, supra note 254, at 537-38. 
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are also other significant factors our article does not 
discuss—including differences in the history, traditions, 
and social conditions of the various Western European 
countries—that have influenced and will continue to 
influence the development of the different standards of 
corporate criminal liability, or its absence, among those 
countries.  We hope that further scholarship will shed light 
on those factors, while at the same time analyzing the 
continued development of the doctrines on which we have 
focused.
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STANDARDS OF LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY AMONG SELECTED WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS 
Country Year Introduced and 
Legislative 
Codification 
Respondeat 
Superior 
Management 
and/or 
Organizational 
Failure 
Parallel 
Individual 
Liability 
Available  
Denmark Limited introduction in 
1926, through passage 
of the Butter Act; 
uniform standard of 
liability enacted in 1996, 
as codified in section 
27(1) of the Danish 
criminal code; 
comprehensive liability 
on corporations enacted 
in 2002, as codified in 
section 306 of the 
Danish criminal code. 
Yes Yes Yes 
Finland 1995, as codified in 
chapter 9 of the revised 
Finish penal code. 
Yes Yes, when there 
is no identifiable 
culpable 
individual 
Yes 
France 1992, as codified in 
article 121-2 of the new 
French penal code 
Yes, but 
generally 
limited to 
instances 
where 
corporate 
officers and 
directors are 
personally 
liable 
No (but note 
expansion of 
negligence-based 
liability through 
July 2000 
amendment of 
article 121-3) 
Yes 
The 
Netherlands 
1976, as codified in 
paragraph 51 of the 
Dutch penal code 
Yes Yes Yes 
Switzerland 2003, as codified in 
article 100quater of the 
Swiss criminal code 
Yes, but only 
in cases of a 
specific set of 
serious 
offenses when 
corporation 
cannot show 
it took 
reasonable 
measures to 
prevent 
offense; 
otherwise, 
not available 
Yes Yes, but 
only in 
cases of a 
specific set 
of serious 
offenses; 
otherwise, 
availability 
of 
individual 
liability 
precludes 
corporate 
liability  
